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Namibia is approaching independence with a very limited 
quantity of either research or baseline data available. 
Its history, the course of the liberation struggle, the 
structure of the economy all suggest that the political 
economic transition will be drastic, rapid and in danger 
of being chaotic. This Discussion Paper seeks to provide 
a basic political economic survey of the land, its 
history, the present economic structures, the political 
economic platform of the liberation movement. It also 
includes a set of statistical estimates - Population, 
Employment, Education; National Accounts; Agriculture, 
Fishing, Mining, Public Finance - to begin filling the 
gap left by the absence of published official statistics.
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A PREFATORY APOLOGIA
Origins Of A Paper
"Namibia: A Political Economic Overview" is not a normal IDS 
Discussion Paper either in its context and format or in its
genesis and history.
Namibia is an occupied territory and was previously a Mandate. 
It is a very difficult place to reach or remain for research 
purposes. But even more striking is the dearth of 
territorial statistics and economic studies. South Africa 
has chosen as a matter of policy to restrict the availabi­
lity (not necessarily the collection and analysis) of basic 
data - e.g. trade and territorial accounts, to present 
others in a wilfully confusing form - e.g. public finance 
and to publish other data of doubtful accuracy - e.g.
Census - or competence - e.g. South West Africa Survey 1974.
Therefore basic data are hard to come by -building up a set 
is something of a cross between fitting a jigsaw puzzle 
and playing a detective game - except.that the pieces do 
not all come from the same puzzle and some of the clues 
are disinformation, or from some other case.
This became clear to the author when in 1976 he took up 
again his interest in Southern Africa. 1976 and 1977 
consultancy work for the United Nations Institute for 
Namibia, 1978-79 service on the Editorial and Steering 
Committees of the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference and 1976 onward advice and assistance to the 
economic affairs personnel of SWAPO (the Namibian Liberation 
Movement) underlined three points:
1. no reasonably complete, accurate or up to date 
compendium of political economic data exists;
2. the absence of such a compendium not only hampers 
research, more critical it will hamper the govern­
ment of an independent Namibia in identifying what 
needs to be done and how it may be possible to set
about doing it;
3. enough bits of quantitative and qualitative data 
exist - even if widely scattered and less than 
fully comparable - to construct a first approximation 
of a compendium.
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This Discussion Paper, therefore, is in a sense a reversion 
to the early days of the author's service as Economic 
Adviser to the Tanzania Treasury. He was then responsible 
for an annual publication initially entitled "Background 
To The Budget" and later "Annual Economic Survey". This 
Paper aspires to be the same type of document - with the 
major difference that it is unofficial, indeed counter­
official .
The core of such a survey is the presentation of data. 
Evidently that requires an unbiased effort to get the 
data - e.g. the average levels of African and European 
personal incomes or the population - correct. It cannot 
mean a lack of any outlook or organizing frame. Ranke's 
view of history as piling up facts which would impose 
their own order or Stendahl's of the novel as a mirror 
perambulating down a highway are not very satisfactory 
guides to Economic Survey writing. If for no other reason, 
the resulting volume would not be portable because it 
would need to include every known piece of data. In one 
sense the organizing framework here is that of national 
accounting and in another that of the Programme of SWAPO
- data is largely selected and organized in an articulated 
national/sectoral account framework and related to a set 
of goals and policy implications derived from the 
Liberation Movement's Programme.
Data includes verbal and qualitative presentation and 
therefore shades over into exposition and quasi descriptive 
analysis. That is, again, a characteristic of an Economic 
Survey. Indeed it is usually the dominant characteristic
- Tables support and demonstrate/illustrate the text 
rather than the text being a brief gloss on the tables.
Finally, an Economic Survey includes evaluation of events, 
policies, causes and trends. It usually presents some 
guide - more or less informed - as to future policies and
- usually rather rashly - future events. This one is no 
exception. It may also highlight areas of concern - 
problems, challenges or opportunities - and pose options 
for dealing with them. The Tanzanian variant often did as 
will its author's return to the field.
And Its Uses
An Economic Survey is not in itself a contribution to theory. 
Nor - with rare exceptions - does it offer major contribu­
tions to analysis. It has rather different uses:
1. To provide a body of baseline data to be used in
analysis and decision taking and to present it in 
one place to save users' time (and hopefully achieve 
some comparability in their starting point);
32. By providing the available data to show the main
gaps and thereby indicate in a rough way the areas 
in which more data collection and organisation is 
needed;
3. As a baseline provide, on the one hand, a point
with which to compare subsequent points for move­
ment and, on the other, a set of first approximation 
estimates which can be refined and improved;
4. To serve as a basis for informed dialogue, identifi­
cation of options and building up more detailed and 
sophisticated analysis;
5. To assist in informing decision taking by its
presentation of data, identification of options, 
discussion of past policy and indication of 
apparently key issues and areas.
No Economic Survey is neutral. Honest in not willfully 
fudging figures, realistic in reading changes and trends, 
self critical in terms of policy and of its own past 
analysis - hopefully yes but neutral no. Neither the 
normal locus of an Economic Survey in a Ministry nor its 
usual authorship by senior, hopefully professionally 
competent and informed, relatively unalienated civil 
servants permits that. This Overview does not seek nor 
purport to be an exception. It starts from the premise 
that the broad thrust of the SWAPO Programme is relevant 
and realistic and that the past and present political 
economy of Namibia can be characterized as the political 
economy of theft. However, its figures and data - subject 
to the bias of the author and the sources available to 
him - seek accuracy not "certain estimation" "proving" 
either the merits of the Programme or the obscenity of 
the Occupation Economy.
An Economic Survey to be comprehensive and a source of 
broadly useable data must surrender the opportunity to go 
into full detail or depth of analysis on any topic and 
restrain itself from vehement poiemicism among options 
or about policies. Moderate criticism, mild advocacy, 
exclusion of "options" seen as professionally or politic­
ally ludicrous - yes - passionate advocacy, no. The 
select bibliography (admittedly not a standard feature 
of Economic Surveys albeit perhaps it deserves to be) 
includes both much more detailed analyses and much more 
passionate excoriation and advocacy from a range of view­
points and by a range of authors.
Transition and Trajectory
Any country sketch of Namibia today faces special problems. 
Namibia is not yet independent - it remains under illegal 
occupation by the Republic of South Africa. Therefore,
4present state and enterprise policies are not those which 
will be pursued (or allowed in the case of enterprises) in 
an independent Namibia. Very major structural changes are 
virtually certain to follow independence and to follow 
very rapidly.
On the other hand either listing probable state and enter­
prise policies or projecting structural changes in an 
independent Namibia is necessarily imprecise. No Liberation 
Movement has the time to articulate detailed policy before 
it is a government nor does it have the data to work out 
sequences and tactics for implementing its strategic goals. 
Enterprise statements on the eve of independence have a good 
deal of bargaining, bluff and blindness in them. South 
African suppression of data make present structural analysis 
so shaky that projections of change seem grounded on the 
shifting sands of Namibia’s deserts rather than on normal 
social science methodology.
The data here so far as they relate to structures are 
specified either as estimates of what exists or rough 
estimates of probable changes. Policy statements unless 
specified as referring to the South African occupation 
regime are rough proj'ections of what actions a newly 
independent Namibian government would be likely to take.
Sources, Methodology, Acknowledgements
Evidently this Overview does not have a government 
statistical office behind it. The sources used include 
government statistics and authors with access to unpublished 
South African data. They also include independent stati­
stical estimates and data compilations from a wide range of 
commercial, journalistic, consultancy and international 
agency sources. These are in no case complete, never 
produce coherent time series and are only too often non­
comparable . The tests for selection have been overall 
internal consistency and plausibility in comparison to 
whatever external yardstock seemed most appropriate (e.g. 
labour force to population ratios in Africa and typical 
per cent undercount in late colonial Censi in estimating 
population).
Extensive use has been made of personal contacts and of 
scraps of information. Oral tradition is not, perhaps, a 
well developed methodology in economic data collection 
(it is in African history) but it has its uses. For 
example data on the present state of Swakopmund Harbour 
comes from a one day visit and a postcard and on its 
original state from an Imperial German war propaganda 
newsreel clip; that onpetroleum products came largely by 
sea through Wolvis Bay was determined by interviewing 
rvamibian students who had lived there and looking at 
amateur photographs of the harbour area.
NAMIBIA; Summary Data
Area: 824,269 sq. km.
Density: 1.6 per sq. km.
Population (1977) 
(1979)
1.250.000
1.325.000
Population Growth: 3%
Official Language: Afrikaans (RSA) Capital: Windhoek
English (SWAPO) (pop. 175-200,000)
Currency: Rand Measures: Metric System
Economic Statistics (1977-79)
Gross Domestic Product Rl,135 million
GDP per capita R 980
Gross National Product R 710 million
Personal Income per capita: African R 125
EuropeanR3,000
Exports:
Imports:
1977 1979
R 1,425 million 
R 1,075
R 950 million 
R 160 
R 3,200
R 700 million R 1,000 million 
R 450 million R 700 million
Main Exports: - 1977 - 1979
Diamonds 40% 47%
Uranium Oxide 14% 27%
Base Metals 19% 10%
Karakul 9% 6.5%
Beef/Cattle 9% 6%
Fish Products 9% 3%
Structure of -1977 -1979
Production
Ranching 11% 9%
Other
Agriculture 3% .2%
Fishing 3'2% 2%
Mining 33% 47%
Fish, Meat
Processing 3§% 2|%
Other Industry 4% 3|%
Cons truction 5% 4%
Services 35% 29%
Public Finance: 1976/77 1978/79
Revenue
Recurrent Expenditure 
Capita Expenditure
R 186.8 million 
R 140.0 million 
R 115.0 million
R 356 million 
R 215 million 
R 140 million
Overall Deficit R 68.2 million R - 1.0 million
(See Tables 1-32 For More Detailed Estimates and Sources)
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6The methodology is evidently extreme pragmatism and ad 
hocery - naked instead of dressed up as in many African 
national accounts and agricultural estimates by states and 
international organizations. The tests used have been 
internal consistency, plausibility of key figures (including 
views of Namibians), comparability of ratios to those in 
not wholly non-comparable African situations .
Because of its origins this Overview has a large number of 
debts to be acknowledged. First to Randolph Vigne and 
Neville Rubin of the Namibia Support Group and Commissioner 
Marteti Ahtisaari of the United Nations Council for Namibia 
who drew me back into studying Southern Africa. Then to 
Roger Murray whose work convinced me serious data estimation 
was possible and to Ndugu John Malac^la of Tanzania and 
Ndugu Mark Bomani of the United Nations Institute for 
Namibia without whose references I would doubtless not have 
been accepted by UNIN or by SWAPO. To my colleagues in 
some of the research especially Kimmo and Marja Lisa 
Kilj'unen of IDS. But above all to the Namibians with whom 
I have worked and especially Comrades Ben and Libertine 
Amathila and John ya Otto of SWAPO and Hidipo Hamutenya,
N. Kaulinge and H. TJitendero of UNIN. And last - but 
probably largest - to a series of harried but helpful 
secretaries and typists at UNIN and IDS who have at one 
time or another dealt with almost every page and table 
of this Overview at least four times during its evolution. .
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NAMIBIA 1979: A SKETCH
The Certainty of Transition
Namibia in 1979 has entered a process of political economic 
transition. The colonial mode of growth and exploitation is 
no longer reproduceable and can only be held in place at 
an ever rising cost. Perhaps R 600 million in Republic of 
South Africa military spending and 60-80,000 troups, 
security police, auxiliaries and mercenaries (ex-UNITA 
Angolans) are not able to prevent a slow deterioration of 
the military situation. Their "operational area" has been 
extended south to the suburbs of Windhoek, the erosion of 
white farmer safety and confidence is running a course 
remarkably similar to that in Zimbabwe a few years ago.
Apart from the short term defense spending burden and long 
term military erosion threat, other forces make transition 
inevitable. Industrial "unrest", political mobilization, 
Namibian church criticism increase the internal precarious­
ness of the colonial occupation. Externally, the untenable 
international legal position since the 1971 World Court 
ruling upholding the Mandate's recovation, the pressures
7from the United Nations and the attempxs at managing a 
negotiated transition by the "Gang of Five" (USA, UK,
Federal Germany, Canada, France) all impinge on South 
African perceptions of the costs and practicabilities of 
continued occupation of Namibia. So do the heightening of 
its internal African levels of consciousness, mobilization 
and resistance.
The question is not whether. The questions are: When?
How? To What? The answers to the first two appear likely 
to be: Within 1 to 3 years. By a semi-negotiated process
involving some type of international xnvolvement.
The Uncertain Nature of Transition
The Namibian economy in 1979 is increasingly affected by 
uncertainty as to the nature of transition. Except for some 
ranchers, ongoing operations are net greatly affected. 
However, very few major investments are being made or medium 
term initiatives taken. This applies to the public - e.g. 
large scale water development, territorial hospital programme
- amd the private - e.g. mine development, cement plant - 
sectors.
The uncertainty will not evaporaxe until a transition is 
determined and in progress. Until then it can only grow.
Four main variants or strategies of transition have been 
canvassed:
1. The traditional Afrlkaaner settler model. This is 
backed by a majority of the resident Europeans and the two 
parties representing them: National and HNP. It proposes
creating a series of bantustans with a loose confederal 
central government. In effect this is the old Odendaal 
variant of separate development and apartheid with a 
confederal gloss. Its "crossracial" Party confederation is 
named Aktur. Some gains to African elites are on offer
- to be financed by higher taxes on large foreign companies 
(especially Anglo American). As even the South African 
state (and the National Party in South Africa of which the 
party in Namibia was formerly the territorial branch) views 
this route as non-viable,it is a non-starter. Without South 
African state backing there would be no army to keep the 
settler regime in being.
2. The new settler model. This is backed by the South 
African state and by a significant minority of European 
residents - especially the German community. Its white 
party is the Republican (which split off from the National) 
and its "crossracial" coalition the DTA (Democratic Turnhalle 
Alliance). A number of African notables and elite members, 
some with a certain following, support DTA. It has - jointly 
with "the Administrator appointed by South Africa - abolished
8petty apartheid but not segregated education or health. Nor 
- in fact as opposed to form - has it moved to end "contract" 
labour or residence control nor to implement equal pay for 
equal work. It does offer the hope of some improvement in 
access to land, education, jobs, small business, the middle 
levels of the civil service - perhaps about as much as the 
Rhodesian internal settlement model. Even these steps and 
promises have triggered violent white demonstrations against 
DTA and its "National Assembly". South Africa has been 
forced to remove its Administrator and substitute no less a 
figure than the President of the Broerbond, Professor Gerrit 
Viljoen. Wnile this transition model has South African 
backing - and therefore gold and guns - it does not have 
significant African acceptability nor any international sale­
ability. An "independent" Namibia on these lines would be 
utterly dependent on a South African military expeditionary 
force throughout its - moderately brief - life expectancy.
3. The "moderate" model. The dominant variant might be 
titled: "transnational leadership with a human face". It is 
backed by some of the major foreign firms - notably Anglo 
American. In Namibia its main representatives are the white 
professionals and managers who make up the tiny Federal 
Party (basically the Namibian parallel to the Progressive 
Federal Party in the Republic). Its strategy is one of 
genuine equality of access achieved through gradual reform,
e.g. integrated education, a land bank, implementation of 
equal pay for equal work and equal opportunity for promotion. 
Basically it would surrender the settler and European working 
class interests to achieve a secure position for white 
professionals and managers and for the major firms for which 
they work. It rejects the first two models as unjust, 
unworkable, unsaleable internationally. The Federal Party 
has had problems in organising a "transracial" coalition or 
creating a single non-racial party. The Namibia National 
Front - some of whose components do have a certain popular 
base and leaders who are more than pure opportunists - is in 
some disarray. The Federal./NNF problem is that it is anti­
government enough to be hindered but not militant enough 
either to attract a true mass base or to stand up well to 
harrassment. Internationally, this model appeals to the 
"Gang of Five" - it is reminiscent of one reading of the US 
civil rights movement's achievements, especially in Georgia. 
However, the Federal./NNF hopes have turned not on winning an 
election but holding the balance of power and organising a 
coalition with "moderate" (i.e. conservative) SWAPO 
supporters and "moderate" (i.e. less reactionary) DTA leaders.
4. The liberation model. In SWAPO, Namibia has a single 
Liberation Movement which, while encompassing a diversity of 
viewpoints on many issues, has avoided major fragmentation 
or internal strife. In that respect it resembles Mozambique's
9FRELIMO. SWAPO probably has the support of 60-75% of the 
black, a significant minority of the "coloured" and a hand- 
full of the white population. Therefore it advocates a free, 
UN supervised election because it has no doubt it would win. 
Its transition model (discussed in more detail in Section VI) 
is strategically radical and tactically flexible. It most 
resembles a telescoped version of TANU/CCM political economic 
transition in Tanzania or that of FRELIMO in Mozambique. 
SWAPO's key tool for securing an election is the guerilla war 
mounted by its PLAN (Peoples Liberation Army of Namibia).
Its second tool is broad international support and formal 
OAU/UN recognition. Even the "Gang of Five" have come to 
believe that SWAPO would dominate any freely elected assembly 
and to accept that seeking to block or rig an election for 
that reason is no longer in their interest,,
The Production and Distribution Base
Namibia enters transition as a territory with moderate levels 
of output per capita - about Si,250 in 1979. However, the 
structure of production is very unbalanced and territorial 
economic integration is exceedingly low. About 90% (in value 
terms) of the value added in the production of goods is 
exported. The economy turns on a handfull of products: beef, 
karakul (persian lamb), pilchards and anchovies, diamonds, 
uranium oxide, base metals (copper, lead, zinc).
Distribution is exceedingly unequal. Gross National Product 
(Si,150 million in 1979) is,on a remittance basis, under two 
thirds of Gross Domestic Product ($1,750 million in 1979). 
Gross operating surpluses of large enterprises (all foreign) 
account for about three fifths of GDP.
Personal income distribution is also radically unequal and 
unequal on basically rational lines. For Europeans it was 
about S3,750 per capita in 1979 and for Africans about S190.
A European artisan can earn S9,000 a year plus fringe 
benefits, an African ranch worker S300 a year including 
housing and food provided in kind .
This base of relatively high productivity, massive enternal 
dependence (concentrated on the Republic of South Africa), 
internal economic non-integration, a very high corporate 
surplus share in GDP and massive racial inequality in income 
goes far to explain both the intensity of the pressure for 
transition and the equal intensity of efforts to avert, 
limit or manage it.
Layout
The next section provides a brief survey of the dynamics of 
the colonial economy. It is followed by an introduction to 
the physical characteristics of Namibia, a review of the
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content of the probable political economic strategy and 
tactics of transition and a series of sectoral presentations. 
These include personpower, productive force levels and 
characteristics, natural resources, industrialization, 
services and infrastructure, Southern African regional 
prospects and external economic cooperation. Two concluding 
sections present a set of Tables and a list of principal 
sources.
IV
THE COLONIAL ECONOMY: GROWTH AND EXPLOITATION
"Before the Germans cameM
Namibia was not a single state or society before its conquest. 
Indeed its northern (Ovambo, Kavango, Caprivi) zone's peoples 
and states had limited contact with those of the south.
The 19th century efflorescence of modern state building in 
West Africa touched Namibia - and particularly Ovambaland - 
but not, it appears, very strongly. Similarly the Southern 
African mfecane process touched off by the advance of the 
European invasions from 1he Cape and Natal also affected 
Namibia in an attenuated form. Several Nama and Coloured 
groups did escape from the Cape; wars of state building 
did occur; a modern cross tribal state existed briefly at 
Windhoek under the Afrikanders - but no unified Southern 
Namibian Empire comparable to either the Zulu or the Basotho 
pattern evolved.
Pre colonial neo-colonialism was also relatively weak - 
Namibia was a distant land even viewed from Capetown or 
Luanda and was guarded by very difficult intervening terrain. 
Missionaries and traders did penetrate. The trade evolved from 
ivory through cattle to human beings. It altered the power 
structure of the states, introduced guns and spirits, greatly 
exacerbated inter state pasture and cattle wars, combined 
with rinderpest smashed the cattle economies.
Conquest and Genocide; The German Days
The German Colonial period of 1875-1915 was begun as a 
chartered company, transited to Imperial Rule in the wars 
of conquest and genocide which lasted until 1910 and 
evaporated in the face of General Botha's South African 
acquisitionary force in 1915.
Germany colonial strategy was mercantile and marginal. Mark 
area raw material sources and no fiscal burden on the 
Imperial Treasury were its aims. Deutsch Sudwes Afrika 
hardly met these tests - but the fort to meet them both 
shattered the Namibian peoples laid the foundation for
South African colonialism.
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From merchant trading, German economic policy moved to 
settler ranching. Land, livestock and labour were acquired 
by force. Soon after .1900 the reaction to this variant 
of primitive accumulation mobilized into Nama and Herero 
wars of liberation. The Imperial response was purposeful 
genocide - 75-80% of the Herero and 50-60% of the Nama/Damara 
were killed. A majority starved or died of thirst after 
being driven into the desert or of hunger or disease after 
being put in concentration camps.
By 19.14 output was perhaps R 12-13 million. Of this about
50% came from diamond mining (near Uuderity not at the main
Oranjemund deposits) and copper-lead-zinc mining and smelting 
at Tsumeb. European ranching was perhaps 15-20% of output. 
German ranchers held about 180,000 cattle and 700,000 sheep 
(largely karakul) and goats (Table 23). The foundations of 
rhe two main mineral and the two main agricultural subsectors
had been established, if not very firmly.
South Africa: The Conquest Completed
The medium term pattern after the South African acquisition 
of Namibia and its ratification by the Leage of Natidns' 
Mandate was not markedly different from the German. The 
irxijor concessionaires were dispossessed - De Beers then 
buying diamonds. Some, by no means all, German settlers 
were replaced by Boers. The trade nexus shifted from 
Germany to the Republic and, secondarily, the United Kingdom. 
Tne wars of conquest went on, including the north over 
which the Germans had not sought to exert direct rule.
The economy did not prosper, GDP in 1920 and in 1929 was 
much like that of 1913 in levels and amount (Table 13). In 
the 1930s it declined over two thirds to R 3.8 million in 1935 
with value added in mining negative and in ranching only 
R 700,000. By 1940 it had recovered to 1919 to 1920 monetary 
levels and while it was R 19.8 million in 1945 in real terms 
this was still below thirty three years earlier.
However 1940-45 did see the cat tie/karakul sector come onto 
a firm basis. 1945-46 saw the beginning of permanent 
substantial mining by Consolidated Diamond Mines (de Beers/ 
Anglo American) at Oranjemund and Tsumeb (AMAX/Newmont) at 
Tsumeb. The fishing industry was also reestablished on a 
viable basis in the late 1940s.
By 1950 GDP had trebled to R 61 million - one third each 
from mining and ranching/fishing. By 1956 it had gone to 
R 141.6 million from which it fell back with lower meat and 
metal prices and fish catches before regaining the 1956 
level over 1960-62. 1965 saw a new spurt to R 213.9 million
- 20% ranching/fishing, 45% mining, and 1970 a GDP of 
R379.4 million, 17% ranching/fishing and 30% mining.
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As of 1970 the colonial economy appeared to be a clear and 
stable success. It was export led, generated a trade surplus 
to cover rising remittances (8% of GDP in 1946, 31% in 1958, 
25% in 1959 - Table 14) of settlers, expatriates and firms 
and provided both relatively high incomes to European settler 
ranchers/businessmen and European employees. Namibia was a 
profitable colony from a South African, a corporate or a 
settler viewpoint. As a captive market for Republic exports 
and a source of remittances it substantially bolstered the 
RSA balance of payments. Tsumeb and CDM were highly 
profitable. Most ranchers had net incomes of R 7,500 or 
more and most European employees enjoyed wages and fringe 
benefits of R 4,000 or more.
However, by 1970 the system was on the brink of crisis.
That crisis related integrally to the colonial economy's 
history and success.
"Contract" and Consciousness
Until the 1960s getting cheap labour was perceived by the 
Germans and the South Africans as the key to making their 
colony viable. The primary means used to secure supply was 
to limit Africans to "reserve" areas so small that subsis­
tence on production (animal and crop) from within the 
"reserve" was impossible. "Work or starve" was a fact of 
life carefully created by the colonial authorities.
The dominant form of labour was "contract". This is a 
system of centralized recruitment in the reserves of 
individual workers for term contracts during which they 
are separated from their families and live in compounds.
By no means the only form of African employment (Tables 
4,6), "contract" involves nearly 100,000 employees - i.e. 
breaks 100,000 households - at any one time. Economically 
it has allowed paying wages below family subsistence 
because the household members required to live in the 
"reserve" were able to house and to some extent feed 
themselves. While probably economically unsound for major 
firms today (though perhaps still profitable for ranches 
and seasonal industries like fish processing), "contract" 
was crucial in allowing the foundation laying for the 
colonial economy.
However, it had other - unintended-- results. First, it 
made virtually all "reserve" households both peasant and 
proletarian. Second, in the compounds it created a setting 
in which interaction, mutual consciousness raising and - 
eventually - mobilisation was possible. Third, by moving 
workers throughout Namibia it laid the foundation for 
national as well as workers consciousness.
From 1970 on there has been a series of surges of industrial 
unrest. The demands have grown steadily broader as well as 
higher. By the 1971-72 general strike the "contract" system
GEOGRAPHY
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itself was the target and by 1978-79 the whole colonial 
system was explicitly challenged.
SWAPO was born in 1960 as a contract workers' organisation. 
Its nationwide organizing grew from that core. Its 
legitimacy grew as worker organisations were suppressed 
(African unions were illegal). The same harassment and 
suppression radicalized SWAPO's perceptions and drove it 
into the launching of armed struggle. "Contract" was 
vital to building the colonial economy; it has also 
proved to be the contradiction which has doomed it.
The Political Economy Of Theft
The historic political economy of Namibia since 1874 is the 
political economy of theft. Theft of sovereignty, theft of 
land and herds, theft of mining and fishing rights, theft of 
the rights of choice of work or residence and of the right 
to organize.
The product by 1970 was a viable European economy, a source 
of significant net external earnings for South Africa, a 
corporate bonanzaland. It was also one of the world's most 
unequal income distributions. Because the economy required 
not only the exclusion and control of the Africans, but 
also their integration into the European economy, it also 
produced an increasingly nationally conscious and militant 
intellectual/peasant/proletarian coalition. By 1979 it was 
clear that the 1963-78 juggling of the Odendaal Report, the 
Turnhalle talks, the controlled elections, the "National 
Assembly" could not resolve or avert the clash between the 
beneficiaries and loosers from the political economy of 
theft.
V
PHYSICAJL CHARACTERISTICS: HARSHNESS AND BOUNTY
The Land
Vast, harsh, varied, fragile, erratically bountiful, 
unforgiving. These are the terms that the physical nature 
of Namibia calls forth.
The area is 824,000 square kilometres (82.4 million hectares). 
Namibia is bounded by Angola and Zambia in the north,
Botswana to the west, South Af :.ca to the south and the 
Atlantic Ocean on the East. - northern and southern
boundaries are basically alor. o or rivers (Kunene,
Okovango, Zambezi systems in tie north, Orange in the south)
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while the eastern is a desert boundary drawn with a ruler on 
a map.
Of the total area about 18 million hectares is pure, sandy 
desert, salt pan, or bare rock. Another 10.4 million is 
forest or open savannah woodland - much of it very sparse. 
Permanent pasture - of low animal carrying capicity and 
great variability - totals 52.9 million hectares. Arable 
land - including 7,000 irrigated hectares but excluding 
potentially irrigable areas - is 0.7 million hectares or 
under 1% of the total area. (See Table 21).
On the east the coastal plain constitutes the Namib Desert - 
its northern zone appropriately known as the skeleton coast. 
Part is composed of drifting dunes, part of fixed dunes and 
part of broken rock and gravel with sparse vegetation. The 
desert country rises into rugged hills and mountains before 
dropping to the central plateau.
The central plateau - and its lower, northern extension 
along the Kunene and Okavango valleys is variegated. In the 
north, relatively flat land broken by seasonal lakes and 
water courses merges into scrub and the huge Etosha Pan, 
the graveyard of an interior river system. The Tsumeb/
GJro otfontein area is relatively rolling, with hilly out­
croppings, small permanent lakes and moderately verdant 
grass, bush, savannah trees.
The surface becomes more broken and the vegetation sparse 
as one proceeds south to and past Windhoek. South of 
Rehoboth the hills and mountains are more pronounced and the 
vegetation scanty as one returns to semi-desert conditions 
around Keetmanshoep and the huge Fish River Canyon.
To the east, the land becomes flatter and more desolate 
merging into the Kalahari desert. The Caprivi strip of 
the extreme northeast is separated from the rest of Namibia 
by a swamp zone and is a part of the southern Zambia/northern 
Botswana savannah country.
Climate, Water, Soil
Namibia is to the south of true tropical climates, albeit 
the Tropic of Capricorn runs through Rohoboth more or less 
in the middle of the territory. Especially on the plateau 
there is a distinct cold season as well as a long hot season; 
the coastal climate is also seasonal and - partly under the 
influence of the Benguela current from the Antarctic - also 
has a markedly cool period. However, most of the year is 
characterized by heat and lack of cloud cover leading to 
rapid evaporation.
This interacts with the low rainfall. The northeast quadrant 
has over 400 millimetres of rain a year. The plateau from
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Tsumeb-Grootfontein to Rehoboth has from 200 to 300 and the 
southern part of the plateau from 200 down to under 100. The 
Namib has 0 to 150. The variability from year to year is 
high throughout the country but even more marked in low 
rainfall areas.
Water availability varies with rainfall but not in any simple 
way. The Oshona country of Ovamboland is at least as 
dependent on seasonal runoff from the Angolan watershed than 
on rain. Tsumeb/Grootfontein have substantial ground water 
near the surface as do a handfull of plateau areas at the 
base of hills.
Pumped borehole and artesian wells can tap water over sub­
stantial areas of the Plateau - the determining factor being 
the depth of the sand cover over bedrock rather than the 
local rainfall. The lower beds of the larger seasonal 
rivers - notably the Swakop and Kuiseb - support narrow 
green belts and pockets. Small scale irrigation can make 
use of these sources; larger scale dam fed irrigation (at 
Hardap near Mariental) has been plagued by salination and 
pan formation.
Large scale irrigation is dependent on border rivers; there 
are no year round Namibian rivers. Ihe Kunene is suitable; 
the Okavango less so because it is in a deep, narrow valley 
during the Namibian portion of its course to the interior 
delta in Botswana where it sinks into the Kalahari. In 
the south, the Orange is suitable judging by South African 
irrigation.programmes in the Upington district across the 
border.
Ihe extreme aridity poses major problems for mines and towns. 
Reservoir and well collection - and tapping the Kuiseb's 
underground flow for Walvis Bay - has nearly reached its 
ceiling. Further water supply apparently requires pipelines 
from the north and/or desalination on the coast.
Soils are mixed. The north and extreme east constitute 
sandveld, the central plateau hardveld. However, both vary 
widely in characteristics. The northern sandveld while not 
very fertile is arable. Ihe Tsumeb-Grootfontein area is 
somewhat more fertile. The extreme eastern sandveld varies 
from pasture to desert partly with rainfall and partly with 
the depth and purity of the sand. Similarly the hardveld 
includes some fairly high quality soil, e.g. the Gkahandja 
- Otjiwarongo district and some areas of almost pure gravel 
and/or exposed rock.
Economic Implications
Pure rainfed farming is almost unknown in Namibia - the only 
evident exception is Eastern Caprivi. Ihe Oshona country in 
Ovamboland, the Okavango Valley, Tsumeb/Grootfontein and
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other crop pockets all depend on specific runoff and 
groundwater potential as much as or more than on rainfall.
In total at most 1% of the surface is suitable for crops - 
usually with low yields. (One bag per hectare is reportedly 
common in the Oshona country albeit this is partly a 
reflection of the state of techniques and of labour supply).
Ranching is possible. It is very extensive, requiring 10 to 
25 hectares per beast: in the northern half of the plateau
for cattle, in the southern and on the western margin for 
karakul sheep, Subject to the low output, per unit of area, 
Namibian pasture, if well conserved, is highly suitable for 
ranchin g.
Mineral resources are massive. Diamonds (apparently from 
the central or eastern South African highlands swept down 
the Orange River and then carried north by the current) are 
found in the Southern coastal area. Major uranium deposits 
lie between Swakopmund/Walvis Bay and Windhoek. A belt of 
base metal (copper, lead, zinc) deposits runs roughly 
northeast from Rosh Pinah (near Keetmanshoep) to Tsumeb. 
Other mineralized zones exist in the Namib/Plateau border 
range and there is some evidence to suggest hydrocarbons in 
coastal waters and the Etosha Pan area.
The coast offers only two natural harbours - Luderitz, with 
problems of entry channel and inshore depth, and Walvis Bay, 
with a first class natural setting. However, the combin­
ation of the Benguela current and the submarine surface does 
provide two previously and potentially very rich fishing 
zones. The inshore one (0-30 miles) comprises primarily 
pilchard and anchovy - subject to altering catch and 
processing patterns to use other varieties - and the 
offshore one (30-200 miles) primarily hake*
The Unforgiving Land
Namibia's ecology is fragile. The bounty - pasture, fish, 
minerals - provided is relatively easily destructible. 
Natural regenerative capacity is low.
Overgrazing can result in progressive deterioration of 
pasture. In extreme cases this becomes irreversible leading 
to desert encroachment.
Overfishing has repeatedly devastated the inshore zone. At 
present it is having the same impact on the offshore.
Mineral resources per capita are not low. More will almost 
certainly be located and proved viable. However, they are 
not unlimited. The absence of any consideration of output 
levels, timing and "when the minerals run out what?" is 
notable for a territory with almost 50% of GDP derived 
from mining and several ghost towns to give one answer to 
the last question.
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p o l i t i c a l e c o n o m i c s t r a t e g y and p o l i c y
Occupation Policy
Present government policy in Namibia is that of the 
occupation regime. While the policy of an independent 
Namibia will evidently be radically different, a brief 
sketch of the South African policy is useful if only to 
point the contrasts:
a. overall state planning in support of, and to focus 
the expansion of, a private capitalist productive 
sector;
b. provision of land, cheap labour, markets, subsidized 
wage goods (especially maize) and supporting services 
for the independent European ranching and fishing 
fleet sectors;
c. provision of infrastructure and fiscal incentives 
for large scale mining (by South African and OECD 
based firms notably Anglo, Amax/Newmont, RTZ, 
Falconbridge).
d. systematic concentration of Africans in "reserves" 
which are not self sufficient even in basic food 
both to clear land for ranching and to provide a 
cheap, certain supply of labour;
e. buildup of an apartheid, separate development pattern 
basically identical to that in the Republic and only 
marginally altered in the past three years;
f. deliberately seeking to involve foreign transnational 
corporations and states in major ventures - notably 
the Rossing uranium project - in an effort to create 
greater geopolitical support for continued South 
African occupation;
g. ruthless suppression of organized dissent by churches, 
workers, political groups and individuals - albeit in 
a more complex and in some ways less complete manner 
than in the Republic itself - especially during 1977-
79;
h. major military commitments (probably of the order of
50,000 fighting and support military personnel and 
R400 million a year by 1977 rising to 60,000 and R600 
million by 1979 )to contain and delay the advance of 
the armed liberation struggle;
VI
i. since 1977 an apparent desire to cut losses by ending
the Angolan/Namibian military commitment, securing an
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internationally acceptable Namibian government, 
salvaging some of its economic stake in Namibia.
Namibian Policy
To seek to delineate the detailed policy of the Namibian 
government after independence would be both rash and 
presumptuous. The Liberation Movement's strategic goals are 
on record but they are not - and could not be at this stage 
- spelled out in detail nor are sequences and timing 
specified. A number of points as to likely policies can be 
made but these are not complete and are subject to more 
inaccuracy than would be true of an existing government.
A. Comprehensive agrarian transformation including:
"land to the tiller" i.e. rapid recovery of European 
holdings with a variety of small holder, communal and state 
farms- but probably not large African capitalist farmer - 
forms used; more emphasis on food (crop) production to meet 
domestic needs and so cease to be "a dependent hostage of 
the particular country which feeds its population"; water 
development more oriented to irrigation.
B. Substantial alteration of ownership patterns
including: a major state role in large scale enterprise
including mining, fishing, finance and commerce as well as 
transport, power, communications and water; a basically 
state owned financial system (possibly with joint venture 
commercial banks) headed by a central bank and an independent 
Namibian currency; a pragmatic approach to most private 
enterprises (mining developments created after the revocation 
of the mandate may constitute a special category) with 
Selective purchase, joint ventures and continued private 
operation used on a case by case basis.
C. Efforts to diversify production including greater
emphasis on processxng exports, on broadening manufacturing 
for Namibian markets and on utilizing a broader range of 
agricultural and forest products in the industrial sector .
D. Total restructuring of production relations including: 
encouraging trade union organization and union participation 
in enterprise planning and management; ending the "contract" 
system and assisting a pattern of permanent employment 
characterized by complete household residence at or near
the place of work; abolition of legally enforced racial 
inequality and building up measures to overcome its heritage 
of inequality.
E. An emphasis on equality and access including: 
creation of a basic services (education, health, communic­
ation, water, housing environment/urban infrastructure) for 
all Namibians; substantially higher rates of both corporate 
and personal income tax probably with much more narrowly 
defined or special case negotiated incentives; immediate
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reduction of inequalities of income, access to services, 
political participation with a view toward elimination of 
"exploitation of man by man" and a transition to socialism 
over a more extended period.
F. A dominant state role in the economy including: use
of central planning as a major coordinating, prioretizing, 
allocating and sequence ordering tool; alteration of 
channels of and markets for exports and building up of a 
greater nationally directed component in production but no 
major intentional reduction of exports.
G. Reduction of dependence on South Africa including 
case by case consideration of the phasing down of personnel 
from and trade with South Africa conditioned by a goal of a 
rapid reduction but also by a desire to avoid major disrup­
tion and to consider options in each case. (This projection 
assumes South Africa does not seek to destabilize Namibia, 
to retain Walvis Bay for an extended period or to make very 
high political and economic demands in return for continued 
- but reduced - trade and use of personnel).
H. Active development of diversified external relation­
ships including deliberate broadening of sources of 
personnel, technical assistance and finance within a policy 
of coordinating such inputs on the Namibian side and seeking 
to ensure that they do not de facto take over technical and 
economic decision taking; promotion of cooperation with 
African states - particularly neighbours and other Front 
Line states; membership in the Gommonwealth; negotiation 
for AGP status probably subject to a substantial beef export 
quota; a clear preference for public rather than private 
external funds and for loans rather than equity but no 
absolute rejection of new joint ventures with foreign state 
or private firms in respect to major new productive sector 
undertakings.
VII
PBRSONPOWER: LABOUR FORCE, OCCUPATION, SKILLS
Population
Namibia's population was probably of the order of 1,250,000 
in 1977, slightly over 100,000 Europeans (excluding South 
African military personnel who would raise the roral to 
about 150,000), 115,000 "Coloured" and 1,035,000 Namibians 
of African ancestry. (Tables 1,2,3). With a growth rate of 
about 3% it had reached 1,325,000 by 1979.
These figures are not consistent with projections from the 
1970 Census which would give about 950,000 in 1977. However, 
most colonial censuses have proven to be 25% or more under-
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counts - colonial subjects believe they have good reason to 
avoid officials. Labour force data for 1977 cannot be 
reconciled with a population figure of 1,000,000 nor, on the 
face of it, with any level much below 1,250,000.
The geographical population division is hard to state because 
of past residence restriction policies which combined labour 
reserves and male temporary labour migration. Further, no in­
dependent government could pursue such a policy - ending 
the "contract" system is a mass demand and at the base of 
the history of the Liberation Movement. Radical population 
moves from the north and, to a lesser degree, northeast and 
east to the main towns, mines and ranching areas are certain 
over the first few years of independence as families are 
reunited.
It appears likely that, even without a rural exodus un­
related to employment opportunities, over 50% of the total 
population will live in towns (including smaller towns 
associated with mining) by the mid 1980s. As that will 
represent at least a doubling of present urban African 
population (much more if one excludes the "contract" 
workers housed in prison compound type dormitories quite 
unsuitable for permanent urban redevelopment use) a 
massive city development problem confronts an independent 
Namibia.
Of the 1,250,000 Namibians about 700,000 are now resident 
in the small agricultural/ranching sector, 200,000 on the 
large (European) ranches and 350,000 in urban areas. Of 
the total labour force of 500-525,000 about half are in 
subsistence agriculture, a tenth in large scale ranching 
and four tenths in non-agricultural activities. These 
figures are distorted by the fact that up to a third of the 
population 300,000 to 400,000), as noted, are resident in 
the small agricultural sector but basically dependent on 
heads of household working in large scale ranching or 
urban occupations.
A further complication in respect to population - and 
residence - estimates results from the war. Approximately
40,000 Namibians are refugees in Angola and Zambia. Perhaps 
an equal number of Angolans are refugees or UNITA military 
personnel being trained by or serving as mercenaries in the 
South African occupation forces.
Economic Activity
The 500,000 plus economically active Naminians include 
about 240,000 in small scale agriculture, 75,000 in domestic 
service, 56,000 in large scale agriculture, 30,000 in 
government, 25,000 in commerce and finance, 22,500 in mining 
and 50,000 in other sectors (Tables, 4, 5, 6). The employ­
ment/self employment figures do not relate closely to output
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as the largest two sectors in economically active person 
terms generate perhaps 4% of GDP while the fifth - mining - 
provides almost half total value added and over three 
fifths of total physical goods produced. (Table 17).
Excluding small scale (basically sub or pseudo subsistence) 
agriculture and domestic service, African employment is of 
the order of 150,000 (25-30% of the 15-55 age group). About 
one third is in large scale agriculture, an eighth each in 
mining and in commerce, a tenth in government, just under a 
tenth in construction and just over a fifteenth in manufa­
cturing plus public utilities.
European employment totals about 36,500 - excluding the 
military occupation forces of about 50,000 (20,000 odd 
fighting and 30,000 odd support personnel). Of the 36,500 
about two fifths are in government, a fifth in large 
agriculture, somewhat over a tenth in commerce and finance, 
about a tenth in mining, just under a tenth in manufacturing 
plus public utilities. Over half the Europeans are South 
African state or state corporation employees, perhaps a 
fifth are employees of foreign based companies and a third 
are self employed (basically in ranching and commerce) or 
employed by locally based firms.
Skills
Perhaps 10,000 of the 500,000 plus economically active are 
managers/administrators (half on the 5,000 odd ranching 
units) and 17,000 professional and technical. Clerical and 
secretarial personnel total about 6,000, foremen and 
supervisors 12,500, skilled non-supervising personnel 
5,000, semi-skilled 50,000 and unskilled 90,000 plus 75,000 
in domestic service. Small scale self employed are 12,500 
and small agricultural workers 240,000 (Table 7).
Of the managerial/administrative and technical/professional 
groups about 20,000 (75%) are European. Excluding primary 
school teachers and nurses the totals become 17,250 of
18,500 (93%). Skilled non supervisory personnel are 
probably about 60% European, secretarial/clerical 40% and 
supervisory/foremen (on a broad definition) 30-35%.
Within the African group there are secondary divergences. 
Coloured workers are somewhat better represented at para- 
professional, clerical and supervisory levels. At foremen 
and semi skilled levels the same applies to Africans from 
the northern areas because of the dominance of the northern 
"contract” recruitment system in extracting the workforce 
for most large enterprises.
For the labour force in Namibia it would appear that perhaps
5,000 Africans (about 1%) have secondary education or above 
and perhaps 52,500-55,000 (11-12%) complete primary or above
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while over 300,000 (64%) have no or negligible education 
(Tables 10, 11). Perhaps another 1,500 Namibians abroad 
have partial secondary education or above including several 
hundred present secondary and tertiary level students.
For the European workers about 10,000 have university or 
other post secondary training, 10,000 secondary or equivalent 
education and virtually none less than complete primary 
education.
Changes In Requirements And Personnel
Projecting the transitional occupational requirements and 
possibilities for an independent Namibia is an exercise 
fraught with maximum uncertainty.
The need to keep the core of the economy (mining, ranching, 
if possible fishing) and its supporting services functioning 
is accepted by the Liberation Movement. Equally, basic 
public services (adult and primary education, basic preven- 
titive and curative medicine, decent housing, urban environ­
ment ) must be expanded very rapidly from an appallingly low 
base by any independent government on grounds of principle 
and of political credibility alike.
In the case of large scale agriculture, the need to maintain 
the extensive veterinary, input, transport and marketing 
support services to the 6,500 odd ranching units (up to
8,500 land holdings) is not in question. However, since - 
except in the north - 90% of useable land is now European 
held, no government can afford to hold back on rapid phasing 
out of European ranchers nor can it afford simply to sub­
stitute expatriate ranch managers leaving the structure as 
perceived by ranch workers unchanged.
In the urban/mining/fishing sectors it is clear that an 
independent government would take over state and state 
corporation (water, power, telecommunications, transport) 
activities and that it would seek - whether by joint 
ventures, selective nationalisation or new parastatal 
bodies - to build up a significant public sector position. 
However, neither the response of the present owners nor the 
details and timing of change can be projected.
How many Europeans will leave, how soon, is imponderable.
Many ranchers almost certainly will if real land reform 
(affecting title and organisation of industrial relations) are 
pursued. Fishing fleet operators are likely to do likewise. 
Barring the unlikely event of sweeping confiscations, small 
urban businessmen seem unlikely to leave en masse and large 
private sector companies still less likely to withdraw their 
personnel. What the South African state will do in respect 
of the 50% of European employees on government and state
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corporation contracts is unclear (probably to the Republic 
as much as to the observers). Their precipitate withdrawal 
would greatly exacerbate transitional problems to put it 
mildly. Their selective (by the independent Namibian state) 
r etention and secondment would ease the technical aspects of 
transition subject to doubt as to what political or economic 
price South Africa would demand for it.
The systematic underrecording of actual qualification and 
work levels of Namibians leaves it unclear how many could 
immediately, or with brief upgrading and gap filling courses, 
replace present European holders of middle level posts.
The speed and scope of technical assistance buildup for gap 
filling training programmes and high level personnel is 
uncertain.
Therefore, the tabular "Independence" and M198511 occupation­
al category estimates (Tables,7, 8, 9) are at best orders of 
magnitude. They assume that about 20,000 Namibians can be 
promoted very rapidly to middle level posts and 2,000 will 
return from abroad for middle and high level posts but that
2,000 (10%) of the 20,000 odd Namibians in middle level 
posts will either leave (e.g. "Cape Coloured" emigration) or 
be politically unacceptable. These are moderately 
optimistic assessments.
They also assume that 7,500 present Europeans (about 20%) 
will remain and be acceptable and that 7,500 new expatriates 
(not necessarily European) can be recruited. The estimate 
on possible retention of present Europeans may be too 
pessimistic especially in respect of farmers, civil servants 
(e.g. medical and veterinary personnel, central ministry 
administrators) and state corporation personnel. That would 
reduce strain as both the "targeted" 7,500 new recruitments 
within 12 months and the possibility of cutting European/ 
expatriate personnel from 36,500 to 15,000 that rapidly 
without major dislocations of sectors the independent state 
would see as key, and without greatly hampering creation of 
a basic service network for Namibian Africans, are optimistic 
estimates justified by necessity more than by parallel 
experience.
The "1985" rough projections are probably easier to achieve 
if major attention is given at once to training and to 
technical assistance recruitment. However, they are very 
vague because the detailed changes in personnel needs 
flowing from socio-political and political economic 
Transition cannot be mapped until after independence. The 
requirement data are largely estimated from Tanzanian 
and Zambian analogues adjusted for any obvious differences 
in Namibian circumstances.
Training, Replacements, Education
Namibia's education system for Africans is weak at all levels 
(Table 11) and beyond academic secondary school level the
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system is exiguous in the extreme even for Europeans 
because they have used Republic institutions. Immediate 
priorities are likely to include:
1. emergency gap filling and upgrading courses for 
Namibians to be (or who have been) promoted;
2. mass English teaching if - as seems probably for 
political and technical reasons - English is to be 
the official language and lingua franca of 
independent Namibia;
3 . articulated adult education from basic literacy and 
basic skills (e.g. agriculture, environmental 
sanitation) through middle level skills and part time 
or correspondence secondary and tertiary education;
4. broadening and upgrading primary education requiring 
both new syllabuses and teacher retraining;
5. working cut and beginning the establishment of a 
coordinated secondary and tertiary system and related 
research capacity (Table 12);
6. identifying and securing places to meet specialised 
training and education needs which can - at least 
for several years - only be met outside Namibia.
Today a wide range of programmes do exist - the Institute 
for Namibia is the largest single institution but even at 
technical and general tertiary levels the sum total of 
students in a large array of smaller programmes is greater. 
However, there is no coherent list of programmes, trainees 
and Namibians with complete secondary or further credentials. 
Nor has there yet been any overall attempt to articulate 
immediate personpower needs and to devise a coherent short 
term programme of courses to meet them.
The barriers to moving ahead rapidly are complex. An 
articulated personpower requirement projection does not yet 
exist. Details on Namibian holders or potential holders of 
middle or high level posts and of their specific training 
needs to fill particular posts are also lacking. Coordin­
ation of bilateral and multilateral technical assistance by 
either SWAPO, the Council for Namibia, UNIN or donors is 
weak. Limited Liberation Movement personnel and attention 
are available because of the requirements of the military, 
political mobilization and diplomatic struggles toward 
independence.
These constraints are doubtless to some extent inevitable 
as long as the trajectory and timing of Namibian independence 
remains less than clear and it is virtually impossible to do 
field work in Namibia itself. However, today it seems that 
a much higher priority needs to be given to at least partially
25
overcoming them.
Women
The Liberation Struggle has included the emergence of coh­
erent organisation by women to demand radical changes in 
traditional and occupational structures which oppress them 
and limit their opportunities. It has already resulted in 
a radically changed draft family law code and in a high 
proportion of women in secondary, technical and tertiary 
training programmes.,
Reuniting of families will bring large numbers of women to 
urban areas and ranches. A reduction in numbers of Europeans 
will sharply reduce domestic service employment - the main 
wage employment avenue (however unsatisfactory) now open to 
women.
As a result two issues are likely to require special attention 
by independent Namibia:
1. ensuring that the high propoation of Namibian women 
with relatively advanced qualifications is maintained 
and results in a parallel distribution of posts;
2. paying special attention to creating decent unskilled, 
semi-skilled, clerical and para professional employ­
ment opportunities (full or part time) for women with 
limited initial education resident in the urban
and ranch sectors. The second may interlock with 
efforts to increase crop production which is more 
labour intensive.than ranching and in respect to 
which Namibian women probable have more experience 
than Namibian men.
VIII
PRODUCTIVE FORCE LEVELS, MAKEUP, DISTRIBUTION 
GDP, GMP and All That
Namibia - despite the hostility and fragility of its 
environment - is not today a territory with a low level of 
productive forces. 1977 GDP was of the order of Rl,100-1,150 
million or R900 (£1 ,0 5 0) per inhabitant (Table 15). In 
1979 it was of the order of R1425 million or Rl,075 per 
capita (Table 17). That is about the world average, 
significantly above the African average and very much above 
that of most other states in the Southern African region 
except the Republic itself.
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However, the economy is very narrowly based - 15% export 
agriculture and associated processing (fish, beef, karakul), 
47% export oriented mining (basically uranium, diamonds, 
copper, lead), 10% services directly associated with export 
production - transport - finance - marketing. Thus almost 
three fourths of output flows from a handful of exports and 
the bulk of the remainder represent services paid for out of 
export proceeds. Under 4% of output represents food 
production for domestic use. Value added in domestic 
market directed manufacturing is even lower.
Further, domestic product (produced in the territory) is very 
different from national product ( accruing to nationals of 
the territory) (Table 14). Gross National Product in 1977 
was about R700 million or about 62^ -'% of GDP and in 1979 
R950 million or 67%. The gap is extremely wide even for a 
territorial economy oriented to export production and largely 
opened up by foreign based firms.
Finally most Namibians are very poor. Surpluses of large 
production units account for almost half of GDP and taken 
together with taxation of enterprise surpluses account for 
three fifths (Tables 15, 17). Personal income was of the 
order of R450-475 million, R375 (£440) per capita in 1977 
and R550 million, R415 per capita, in 1979. However, the 
distribution is such that the average European personal 
income per capita was R3,000 and the average for Africans 
R125 in 1977 and R3,200 versus R160 in 1979. The latter 
average - roughly adjusted for price differences - indicates 
that Namibian Africans have lower real personal incomes 
than Tanzanians despite Tanzania being one of the world's 
poorest countries. A comparison of public service access 
(especially in rural areas) leads to an even stronger 
conclusion that the Africans of Namibia have less than 
those of Tanzania.
GDP Trajectory and Makeup
The overall growth of GDP in Namibia over the 1945-75 period 
was rapid - quite possibly of the order of 5% a year in real 
terms (Table 13). The growth shifted the balance among 
exports - especially toward mining and toward diamonds with­
in mining. It did not reduce - indeed it enhanced - the 
dominance of production for export.
However, over the period since 1974 the Namibian economy has 
stagnated. While increased diamond production and the 
buildup of production at Rossing (500 tonnes oxide in 1976, 
perhaps 3,000 tonnes in 1977, probably at least 4,000 tonnes 
in 1978 and over 4,000 in 1979 mean that total GDP has grown, 
a series of setbacks have affected other sectors :
a. overfishing has cut catches from 900,000 tonnes at
the turn of the dec a 7>erhaps 200,000 (including
only 46,000 of the key h - anchovy) by 1978
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creating massive employment losses and seriously 
affecting trawler owners and the Walvis Bay commer­
cial sector;
b« South African policy has caused cuts in the Namibian
cattle marketing quota and South African price 
controls have artificially depressed its value putting 
beef ranching sector in a price and a quantity scissors 
only slightly alleviated by rather belated and 
marginal efforts to build up sales outside the Republic 
plus a R4.5 million subsidy in 1978-79;
c. the collapse and continued stagnation of the copper
price has led to the closure of one of the three
major mines (Otjihase) and retrenchment in the face
of losses at the other two;
d. while military construction spending has risen, that 
for works and government buildings has been cut back 
theoretically because of revenue limits but 
realistically because of uncertainty as to the 
duration of the occupation;
e. with the advance of the Liberation Struggle, 
uncertainty - with postponement of most new invest­
ment and remittance of savings by individuals - has 
created a general lack of buoyancy.
If major damage to mining and ranching during the transition
can be avoided, independent Namibia's economy has good growth
prospects (Table 17). Rossing should reach full production 
by 1979-80 and an equally major operation, Langer Heinrich, 
now in development stage, could reach full production a few 
years later. Between them they would then yield $800-1 ,0 0 0  
million of exports and $500-750 million value added.
Diamond prices have risen over 80% since the beginning of 
1977 and show an upward trend. Namibia's reserves - on a 
conservative basis - will last into the 1990s. Base metal 
price recovery by the mid 1980s seems likely. By 1985 
(Table 19) the" mineral sector - excluding any new mines - 
should be producing well over R1,000 million ($1,200 
million) in exports and contributing R850 million ($1,000 
million to GDP. This would undergird import capacity, 
investible surplus and government revenue.
Ranching requires market redirection - and overcoming 
transitional problems. At best it is a low growth sector 
because of carrying capacity limits. From a very small 
base, crop husbandry could be expanded significantly.
Fishing - after a 3-4 year "'rest" likely to be imposed in 
any event by the transition - can be built up to higher 
than past peak levels if - as seems certain - Namibia 
impose and - as is less clear - can enforce a 200 mile 
economic waters zone and a strict quota system for foreign 
vessels.
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The provision of basic services and the building of houses 
for reunited families plus associated urban infrastructure 
will require rapid growth in the construction and service 
sectors. In short, given the ability to sustain and build 
on present core production, Namibia should have the export 
earnings, investible surplus and government revenue to 
embark on a national economic development strategy which 
could reduce inequality, broaden access to basic needs and 
provide substantial economic growth.
About half of GDP in 1977 was derived from the primary 
sector. Mining is 33%, fishing 3.5% (over 90% large scale 
export oriented), large scale farming 12% (again up to 90% 
export oriented) and peasant subsistence agriculture under 
2% of normal GDP price estimation levels. By 1979 mining 
had risen to 47%. The agricultural share is very low - 
especially by African standards. The 2-3% contribution of 
domestic food production to GDP among the lowest in the 
world. Even revaluing "subsistence sector" household self 
consumed food production at retail prices would only raise 
this to 4-5% (Table 15).
The secondary sector contribution to GDP was about 14% in 
1977 and 11% in 1979. Of this about half came from 
manufacturing (one half meat and fish processing for export) 
and over a third from construction. The sector is small, 
even by African standards. Indeed the construction and 
electricity/water components are so low as to suggest 
underestimation resulting from the problem of disentangling 
South African and Namibian operations of units operating 
in both territories.
Tertiary sector activities (services) contributed slightly 
over a third of GDP. Again division of South African and 
Namibian value added in commerce, transport, finance and 
general government poses major difficulties. The estimates 
exclude military and police expenditure (including 
construction financed under this head) both because they 
hardly appear to be a contribution to Namibian output (much 
less a contribution to estimating future Namibian GDP) and 
because they are financed from Republic votes details of 
which are unavailable.
Distribution of GDP
Wages, salaries and subsistence production in Namibia take 
about 30% of GDP, surpluses of production units 55% and 
taxes on those surpluses 15% (Tables 15, 17). The share of 
wages - salaries - subsistence is very low. Fifty to sixty 
per cent (including peasant subsistence production) would be 
a more typical range in sub-Saharan Africa and 50-65% wage 
and salary shares are typical of most industrial economies 
with Singapore's 35% about the lowest recorded.
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Within the production unit surpluse category, R500 million 
odd in 1977 and R700 million in 1979 accrued to large 
enterprises (as depreciation, interest on debt, after tax 
profit and reserve additions). These firms are without 
exception based outside Namibia. The major South African 
groups - e.g. Anglo-American/De Beers and General Mining 
and parastatal bodies like ISCOR and IDC “ are "the most 
important. Next are major mining transnationals 
particularly RTZ and Amax/Newmont, with major international 
banks (Barclays, Standard), petroleum companies (Shell, B.P, 
Total) having substantial but lesser units.
The estimated 44% large, foreign enterprise operating 
surplus less tax share in GDP is probably the highest in the 
world although Gabon in some years may have approached it. 
The distribution flows directly from the heavy export 
oriehtation with mining, meat and fish processing, finance 
and import/export trade dominated by large firms. The 9 to 
10% share of smaller (basically family) European enterprise 
surpluses comes primarily from ranching, fishing trawler 
operation (albeit not in 1977-79 which were very bad years 
for that sector), retail commerce and urban service estab­
lishments .
African wages and salaries (including "fringe benefits") 
in 1977 were of the order of R100 million for over 200,000 
workers and European of the order of R200 million for 
perhaps 30,000. The per-worker averages are R500 and 
R7,000 per annum. The lowest African wages are in domestic 
service (ca R125-200 per annum) and ranching (ca R250-400 
per annum including payment in food and shelter) - which are 
also the largest generators of employment. African wages 
in large enterprises are substantially higher - and as the 
prospect of independence imposes itself on employers ' minds 
have been rising steeply - with some mining firms possibly 
paying an average approaching Rl,500 (including payment in 
kind) by 1977 and a handful of skilled African employers 
as high as ca R2,500. Policies as to wage levels and 
quality of housing/food provided have been sharply 
different within the mining sector - Oranjemund (Anglo- 
American) has usually been perceived by workers as "best" 
with Tsumeb (Newmont/Amex) above average and Swaco, 
(Consolidated Goldfields) and Rossing (RTZ) among the worst. 
Variations within the small enterprise sector are even 
wider. By 1979 African wages had risen to perhaps R130 
millions and 25-40% 1977-79 increases were not uncommon.
The average, however, remains substantially below the urban 
household poverty line.
Personal income (subsistence production, wages and salaries, 
small enterprise surpluses) is of the order of 40% of GDP 
(Tables 15, 17). Of this perhaps one third accrues to 
Africans and two thirds to Europeans. Per capita this came 
to about R125 per African and about R3,000 per European 
in 1977 and R3,200 and R160 in 1979.
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Household data are almost impossible to estimate meaning­
fully because in the case of the 100,000 households including 
a "contract" (single male worker, absent from his family, 
compound or "quarters"' resident) employee, the concept gf a 
single household budget (or even closely coordinated budgets 
of different income streams) is simply not applicable.
The ratio of 20 to 1 between per capita African and European 
incomes is not in itself necessarily uniquely high for 
Sub-Saharan Africa. Relatively small expatriate communities 
largely made up of managers and professionals may well have 
incomes averaging R8,500 (#10,000) and average African wages 
of R500 (#600) or less are not uncommon. The differences in 
Namibia are structural:
a. the European community is not limited to a small group 
of highly skilled personnel but includes many middle 
level personnel;
b. total European wages and salaries are of the order of 
twice total African wages and salaries;
c. Africans are virtually excluded from high level posts, 
sparsely represented at middle level and similarly 
virtually totally excluded from all but the smallest 
of individual enterprises.
By contrast in Zambia, where the number of expatriates is 
similar in absolute terms, the wage ratio in 1974 was 5 : 1 
(vs 14 : 1) and the total African wage bill was twice as 
large as the expatriate (vs half as large).
The agricultural sector illustrates this. The 6,500 
European units have average gross incomes of the order of 
R20,000 and average net incomes to proprietors of R10,000 
- somewhat down on 1973-75 peak levels, especially in beef. 
African farm workers (50,000) receive annual wages of about 
R300 - half in cash and half in "rations" and lodging.
Even valuing self consumed food at retail prices the
150,000 households engaged in African agriculture have a 
cash and kind farm income of not much over R100 per person 
or 400 per household.
External Flows and Balances
With about 90% of physical goods production destined for 
export and about half of basic foodstuffs, perhaps three 
fourths of consumer manufacturers and over 90% of capital 
goods uses met from imports, Namibia's economy is about as 
fully integrated into the world economy as it is possible 
to be. The resource gaps (land suitable for intensive 
cultivation, large domestic market) and strengths (minerals, 
fish,ranching land) do not require the present form and
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pattern of integration but they do constrain any independent 
Namibia to maintain a high ratio of foreign trade to CUP.
Exports of goods in 1977 (Table 18) were of the order of
700 million (61% of CUP) and in 1979 (Table 19) R 1010
(71%). Minerals account for 85%, fishery products 3%, 
ranching products 13% (altered from 70%, 10% and 20% in 1977).
Beef exports are primarily (about 80% in most years) and 
fish products substantially (over 50% normally, 100% except 
for lobster in 1979) to South Africa with the balance of 
beef, karakul and fish largely exported through the Republic. 
Karakul beyond the ranch is dominated by three firms.
Mineral exports are only peripherally to the Republic (a
secondary market for lead, zinc, copper). Most metal 
concentrates and ingot are shipped direct to Europe and 
North America while uranium oxide is airfreighted direct 
(as befits its $40 plus per pound value). Diamonds are 
marketed through De Beers Central Selling Organization 
(London based) but apparently usually are flown via and 
sorted/valued in the Republic.
In the case of beef South Africa is the only possible 
market for mass live cattle sales. However, the market is 
quota limited and price controlled. The past state and 
parastatal decisions not to enlarge packing plant and 
tinning facilities and develop external markets more rapidly 
have harmed Namibian growers in several years and will pose 
major problems to independent Namibia. Fish meal and fish 
to the Republic receive controlled prices below those on 
the world market and overseas sales are not allowed until 
South African quotas are fulfilled.
Visible imports (excluding military forces imports) are 
probably of the order of R450 million in 1977 and R700 in 
1979 (Table 20). Of these about two thirds are from and 
a higher proportion are imported through the Republic.
This pattern results partly from the fact that Namibia is 
within the South African tariff zone, partly from South 
African subsidization of maize (to benefit South African 
growers and to keep wages low by keeping the staple food 
cheap) andpartly from the structure of commercial links 
which run through the Republic.
Both imports and exports are handled largely by South African 
based bodies except for base metals and uranium oxide in 
which cases the major managing firms are European (RTZ) or 
North American (Newmont, Falconbridge) based. Ihe petroleum 
importers are part of the South African region of the parent 
transnationals. They import petroleum products refined in 
the Republic through Walvis Bay.
Data on other balance to payments items are exceedingly 
fragmentary. Imports of services (transport, travel, fees
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and royalties, tourism) substantially exceed exports 
(primarily South African tourism to Swakopmund, the Etosha 
Pan Game Reserve and other National Parks).
Remittances from current income (including interest and 
dividents) in 1979 probably included about R80 million for 
individuals (1977 R85 million) R320 million for large firms 
(1977 R302 million) and R75 million (1977 R40 million for the 
state net of railwaysAiarbours and posts/telecommunications 
operating deficits for a total outflow of R425 million.
Long term capital - excluding capital flight - was probably 
of the order of R200-225 million in both years over half on 
state development projects, about a quarter on mineral 
prospecting plus Langer Heinrich uranium oxide mine and 
Pilot plant development and most of the balance transport, 
communications, electricity and water parastatals.
Capital flight - largely via bank and other financial 
institution transfers to the Republic - may have been of 
the order of R100 million in 1977 and R150 million in 1979. 
Its counterpart was primarily a reduction in financial 
institutions' Namibian branches'net claims on South African 
branches and head offices.
Public Finance
Namibian public finances are exceedingly difficult to 
estimate. Most revenue is collected by the Republic - not 
the SWA Administration - and most expenditure paid out of 
the Republic's South West Account. Territorial expenditure 
is largely financed by transfer from the Republic account. 
Local government units are self financing. Military, most 
police, and foreign service expenditure does not appear on 
any Namibian (SWA) accounts and research and specialized 
service expenditure may or may not be fully covered by 
transfer from the Republic account. Similarly the revenue 
and expenditure of the central bank in respect of Namibia 
are not available.
If both defence (at a South African financial press estimate 
of R400 million) and capital spending are included there was 
a deficit of the order of R450 million. If both are 
excluded there was probably a surplus (on government recurr­
ent account) of the order of R45 million in 1976-77 (Table 
31). Because of an upsurge in diamond revenues this had 
probably risen to R150 million in 1978-79 (Table 32).
In 1976-77 estimated consolidated Recurrent Spending from the 
Republic 's South West Account and the Territorial account 
was of the order of R140 million and revenue of R187 million. 
Capital account spending (including R48 million in respect 
of parastatal water and power investment) was to be of the
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order of R115 million. In 1979 the comparable figures are 
probably R215 million recurrent expenditure, R356 million 
recurrent revenue and R140 million capital account expen­
diture .
Railways/Harbours and Posts/Telecommunications 1976-77 
recurrent revenue was estimated at R45 million and expendi­
ture at R68 million for an operating deficit of R23 million 
plus an additional capital account spending of R18 million. 
The deficit has almost certainly widened since despite sharp 
rate increases. Local government and special account 
spending of about R40 million was largely balanced by 
anticipated revenue.
Public expenditure - excluding defence, railways/harbours 
and posts/telecommunications - was in 1976-77 the order of 
R322 million and R400 in 1978-79 or about 30% of GDP.
Useable breakdowns of recurrent expenditure do not exist 
because of the form of the accounts. About one third of 
recurrent expenditure appears to represent social services, 
pensions and similar items for Europeans, about a quarter 
economic services (agriculture, water, roads, etc) primarily 
for Europeans and about a tenth general (excluding "Bantu", 
’'Homeland'*, "Coloured”) administration. The one third 
r epresenting African and "Coloured” spending is largely 
categorized as administration and development (not including 
health or education) and appears to represent first European 
salaries, second African administrative and "chiefly" 
functionary salaries, third associated pure administration 
costs and fourth minor works.
Service levels are radically unequal. For education African 
(including "Coloured") estimates for 1976/77 were R4.75 
million and for European R15.85 million. Ihe first averages 
a bout R4 per capita and the second about R150 per capita 
or a differential of nearly 40 to 1.
Recurrent revenue on the two main accounts has been 
dominated by diamond taxation. In 1976-77 this was estimated 
at R51.5% or 28% of total recurrent revenue and in 1978-79 
it probably approached R200 million as a result of higher 
output, prices and bunching of sales. The total ratio of 
tax to surplus on diamond mining may - as claimed be De Beers
- approach 60% in some years but this is not high for even
reasonably successful diamond mines (e.g. the Williamson 
mine in Tanzania has a state/De Beers surplus division 
pattern of about 80%-20%).
Other company taxation plus dividend remittance tax and 
other mining royalties and taxes for 1976-77 were estimated
at about R32.5 million (17.5%) for a total of R84 million
(45%) on the revenue of large companies. In 1978-79 
(Table 32) they were only 5% of revenue for a large company 
total of about R206 million (58%). Individual income tax 
yields about 11% of revenue (down from 14% in 1976/77) and 
is about 12.5% of European wages and salaries.
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Indirect taxation provides under 20% of recurrent revenue 
(down from 25%) largely from import (perhaps R25 million or 
on average about 12f% of non-Republic import values) and 
excise (about R20 million largely on beer, spirits and 
cigarettes at rates low by world or African standards). 
Miscellaneous receipts including licences, fees, departmental 
sales of services were estimated at R32-33 million (17% in 
1976/77, 9% in 1978/79).
These data cast grave doubts on South African claims that 
Namibia is not fiscally viable. Even projecting sharply 
increased mass services and expanded capital spending, 
together with mining and income tax rates more in line 
with other independent African states and a higher (but 
still relatively low) sales tax a perfectly plausible 
1985-86 Budget requiring only a 20% ratio of borrowing to 
capital spending can be constructed (Table 32).
IX
NATURAL RESOURCES; THE PRIMARY SECTOR
Namibian's basic natural resources are water, land, fish, 
and minerals. The first features as a constraint on the 
utilization of the second and fourth. The last two are 
available in some abundance but subject to depletion as 
demonstrated all too clearly in respect of fish over
1976-79.
Water
As already noted Namibia has rainfall which is low in the 
north (marginal for crops), quite low in the northern half 
of the Central Plateau (sub-marginal for crops, suitable 
for cattle), very low in the southern half of the Central 
Plateau (sub-marginal for cattle, suitable for sheep) and 
nearly non-existent on the Coast and in parts of the 
Eastern Frontier (suitable for sand dunes and century 
plants).
No domestic rivers flow throughout the year and the two 
largest - Swakop and Kuiseb - only reach the coast in 
substantial volume on the surface during the heavy rains 
although they are perenial underground. The Orange River 
on the Southern Frontier (not used for irrigation), the 
Kunene in the north centre and north west (used for 
irrigation to a trivial extent), the Okavango in the north 
centre ( used for irrigation in its narrow valley) and 
lesser rivers in the Caprivi (not used for irrigation) are 
perennial. The river system flowing from Angola through 
Ovambo to the Etosha Pan is not perennial but is the 
key source of water (more than rainfall) to the Oshana 
region which is central to present and future crop production.
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Water development has centred on capturing major seasonal 
and permanent (Kunene) supplies for towns and mines. There 
is a need to increase the flows from the Kunene (and South 
African plans and partially complete works to do so) which 
will be made more urgent by the rapid increase of urban 
population with the termination of the "contract" system.
Ranch and small scale arable cultivation water has been 
derived from .6,000 boreholes (only 500 in African areas) 
and 5,000 odd check dams (with sand filled reservoirs to 
limit evaporation). In a few areas - notably around Tsumeb 
- perennial lakes and springs have also been available for 
such use. How much more water can be raised in this way 
without high pumping costs and lowering the water table is 
uncertain - in some areas the amount is probably substantial, 
in others the present extraction rate may already be too 
high.
Tapping underground rivers near the coast for irrigated 
agriculture may be feasible in some cases. However, the 
Kuiseb is already being overtaxed by Walvis Bay offtake so 
that it appears that the Swakop and Kuiseb together are 
likely to be barely adequate to meet Rossing/Swakopmund/ 
Walvis Bay requirements by the mid-1980s. Their small 
"green belt" farming can perhaps supply more of the coastal 
towns dairy, fruit and vegetanle needs but not much more.
The Orange River is a potential source for irrigation (and 
power). Some irrigation from it is in hand on the Republic 
side. Fairly evident political problems exist for water 
offtake and even more a dam. This is complicated because 
South Africa claims the boundary runs on the north bank not 
the median. This may be based on the German statement of 
the area of their colony. In at least one other case German 
documents simply stated the land in the colony and not 
where the frontier ran in a water boundary. Thus they 
claimed land down to Lake Nyasa but did not mention the lake. 
However, they had commercial and naval vessels on it which 
rather negates a view they thought the boundary ran on their 
shore.
The Caprivi rivers can be used for irrigation and also to 
drain the Central (or West) Caprivi swamps. However, no 
studies appear to have been made to date.
The Okavango is a potential major water source but its 
narrow, steep valley will pose problems for utilization.
The seasonal river - Osbana system requires further study; 
more water could presumptively be put through over a longer 
period by tapping the Kunene or Kavango. The two present 
main irrigation canals are apparently badly designed and of 
little value at least for agriculture.
The Kunene is the probable key source for water for urban 
and industrial use and for hydroelectric power. To date the 
Caleuque reservoir (located in Angola and built under South
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African/Portugese cooperation) is not available but it would 
be to an independent Namibia. Ruacana Falls dam is completed 
and more or less connected to the national power grid but 
non-operational so long as Caleuque is not activated. With 
access to Caleuque and with independence it should be possible 
to make it fully functional removing present pressure on load 
limits of existing thermal stations. Ruacana's capacity is 
320 megawatts, the expanded Windhoek station 120 and Walvis 
Bay 30. National grid load supposedly will reach 150 in 
1980.
Water resource development beyond present levels is possible. 
On the technical side a 25 year South African plan exists 
but is geared neither to African crop growing nor trans­
formation from "contract" to resident household based African 
employment. Indeed the related irrigation studies center on 
Okahandja - Otjiwarongo in the "white" ranching zone not on 
the north. Even on South African assumptions the cost of 
meeting water needs will be very high.
In the longer term sea water desalination (still more 
expensive than piping from Caleuqueor recycling), possibly 
using atomic power, seems likely to be necessary at least 
for the Walvis Bay/Swakopmund/Rossing cluster and perhaps 
for the Windhoek metropolitan area.
Land
Of the 82.4 million hectares of Namibia over 50 million 
hectares is usable for extensive ranching, mixed farming, 
crop husbandry but - barring major irrigation schemes - 
not over one million for crop farming with much of that at 
best ultra marginal (Table 21).
Present land use is even more dominantly focussed on 
animal husbandry. (Table 22, 23, 26). Subsidized South 
African maize, herding Africans into reserves and hindering 
their development of commercial food production (at least 
until recently) and provision of services/infrastructure/ 
markets for cattle have all contributed to the situation in 
which over 90% of value of agricultural output is livestock 
or livestock products (about 95% for marketed European 
output). Even the once thriving dairy and dairy products 
industry has been discouraged, up to 90% of agricultural 
output is exported and over half of domestic food 
consumption (up to half for grain in normal years and more 
in droughts, almost 100% of other foods except meat, fish, 
dairy products) is imported.
The buildup of production in grains, vegetables, fruits and 
(to meet increased demand with higher African incomes) 
expansion of dairying centered on milk not butter can begin 
at independence. It may be possible to reach near self 
sufficiency in these products but knowledge, input, water,
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marketing and transport gaps suggest that change will take 
several years.
Present cattle population is of the order of 3,000,000 - 60% 
European. Offtake fluctuates widely with 600,000 head (about 
75% European owned) attained in good years. Of the European 
cattle most are exported on the hoof by rail to the Republic. 
The balance plus the African owned cattle are slaughtered 
domestically and exported as chilled or tinned beef - partly 
to but dominantly through the Republic. Overall 80% goes to 
the Republic, 12% to other foreign markets, 8% to local 
consumption. An elaborate veterinary and service system - 
including detailed ranch planning and capital subsidies - 
exist for the 3,000 odd European cattle ranches. Even in 
respect of African cattle a fairly comprehensive vaccination 
and disease control service is provided (presumably to avert 
epidemics which might spread to European ranches). Karakul 
sheep, 90% on 3,000 European ranches, number over 3,000,000 
- at or even above sustainable carrying capacity - yielding 
about 3,000,000 lamb pelts a year plus quite secondary 
wool and meat products from adult sheep. The Namibian 
industry is the world's largest (Afghanistan, the USSR and 
the Republic are the other major ones) but is now unable to 
expand despite buoyant markets which have taken the average 
pelt value from R7 in 1960 to R18 in 1970 and above R50 by 
1976. Several hundred thousand non-karakul sheep are 
largely African owned and appear to give rise to negligible 
marketed output.
Goats and poultry are significant in some African agricultu­
ral units but excluding a few large chicken ranches are not 
prominent in the European sector. Game ranching seems to 
be on an experimental rather than a truly commercial basis 
although in principle it should be viable in several areas 
including that surrounding the Etosha Pan.
Fi sh
Namibia- possesses the richest inshore and deepwater fishing 
zones of tropical Africa (Tables 27, 28). The main inshore 
fish are pilchard and anchovy and the main deepwater one is 
hake. A secondary domestic industry (based in Luderitz 
unlike inshore fishing which is dominantly based in Walvis 
Bay) is lobster. Minor sealing still exists on offshore 
islands and parts of the aptly named Skeleton Coast of the 
north.
The fishing industry is in a state of chaos resulting from 
the wholesale rape of the marine reserves. The inshore and 
deep-water problems are somewhat different.
The inshore industry probably has a sustainable catch level 
around 1,000,000 tonnes if sensible deepwater and inshore 
controls are used and if "secondary" fish (red-eye, mackeral, 
maasbanker) are brought in and used instead of dumped.
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However, factory fish ship operations in 1967-69, trawler 
and seiner expansion, overconcentration on anchovy and 
pilchard and the lack of effective regulation outside a 20 
mile limit have caused catches to decline from 1.5 million 
tonnes in 1968 - and 700,000 to 800,000 over 1973-75 - to
572,500 in 1976, under 350,000 in 1977 and perhaps about
250,000 in 1978-79.
The owners of the trawler/seiner fleet, of the factories and 
their 7,000 odd African employees have been badly hit by 
the decline. A period of very low quotas appears likely to 
be required to restore capacity - a period likely in any 
event to be enforced by a withdrawal of the vessel owners 
(basically individuals not large firms) to South Africa at 
i ndependence.
The catch is almost all processed in a dozen factories. The 
output is about 20% of catch weight as fishmeal and 4% as 
fish oil (basically from anchovies) and about 25% as tinned 
pilchards. In 1975 for example 194,000 tonnes of tinned 
pilchards (sold globally under Republic labels or under more 
deceptive titles such as ,rForeign Produce" and "Produce of 
Peru"), 28,300 tonnes of fish oil and 146,600 of fish meal 
(largely sold to the Republic for animal feed and fertilizer 
use at prices fixed below world levels) were produced.
Deepwater fishing is theoretically regulated by the 
International Commission for the South East Atlantic 
Fisheries - a somewhat dubious Cfommission as FAO (the normal 
fishery convention coordination body) has declined to register 
it and recognizes Namibia (UN Gouncil) as a full govern­
mental member. Control is made difficult by the fact that 
South Africa has not seen it as prudent to declare a 200 
mile territorial limit off Namibia (as it has off the 
Republic).
Declared catch in 1975 was of the order of 500,000 tonnes - 
40% by the USSR, 33% by Spain, under 4% by South Africa. As 
over 95% of the recorded catch was hake it seems likely 
that other varieties may have been dumped. The 1975 figure 
is a decline from over 800,000 tonnes in 1972 but whether 
this is real or a "formal" response (in reporting but not in 
catching) to quota cuts is unclear.
An independent Namibia will need to declare a 200 mile zone 
and limit catches - bilaterally or within a proper FAO 
registered convention. In addition it will need to consider 
its strategy as to requiring high licence fees, domestic 
processing of catch and/or a substantial Namibian share in 
the catch. Fairly major problems of enforcement and of 
fleet development can be foreseen.
Minerals
Namibia so far as GDP, exports, tax revenue and investible
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surplus go is dominantly a mineral economy (Tables 15, 17,
18, 19, 29, 30,32). In this sector prospects are bright 
to the end of the century in respect to the key products - 
uranium oxide and diamonds - and there is reason to 
believe further prospecting would significantly raise 
reserve estimates especially in respect of uranium.
Rossing (near Walvis Bay) is the world's largest uranium 
oxide complex costing over 5300 million and with a capacity 
of 5,000 tonnes of yellowcake a year worth about 5450 
million at current market prices. After serious initial 
technical problems, Rossing is moved toward full production 
in 1979-80 and by the end of 1978 was at or above a 4,000 
tonne annual rate.
A complex of similar size is under construction (a pilot 
plant is said to be in operation) at Langer Heinrich (in 
the hill country between Windhoek and the coast) and 
several additional propsects are viewed as promising.
Political problems exist. Rossing was developed after the 
1966 revocation of the Mandate and therefore is, under the 
International Court of Justice decision, based on unlawful 
agreements. Its managing agent and majority equity (but 
not voting power) holder is RTZ. Its major financier is 
South Africa's Industrial Development Corporation 
(via loan capital). In addition, major forward oxide 
sales - equally invalid or unlawful under the World Court 
opinion - have been made at prices well below current 
levels.
Diamond output in 1979(1,900,000 to 2,000,000 carats) is 
likely to be worth about 5625 million at full selling 
price and about 5550 million at the price at which 
Consolidated Diamond Mines sells to its Republic parent.
Of this about a quarter or less represents production cost 
and three quarters CDM pre tax profit. Namibian output is 
entirely by CDM (De Beers) in the area north of the coastal 
border town of Oranjemund. Reserves are estimate at 15 to 
20 years - but standard De Beers policy is to identify 
reserves formally only up to that period so the actual 
potential life is unclear even on known diamond bearing 
sand dunes and encloseable shallows much less on marine 
(closed as uneconomic at a time when prices were half 
present levels and demand relatively stagnant) or less fully 
prospected zones.
Namibia produces about 2 million carats of a world total of 
the order of 55 million (1.75 million of 49.4 million in 1975). 
However, world gem diamond output is of the order of 12 
million carats so in that market Namibia ranks third after 
South Africa and the USSR with about a sixth of total output. 
Production is totally by shifting sand and gravel in dune 
country and enclosed paddocks in shallow waters - the 
diamonds are alluvial carried by the Orange River and Benguela 
current.
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The oldest mineral industry - indeed with a pre colonial 
history - is copper. Three major groups - (Tsumeb) Newmont/ 
Amax , Falconbridge (Oamites mine), and Johannesburg 
Consolidated (Otjihase mine) have a total capacity near
75.000 tonnes metal equivalent with Tsumeb having smelting 
capacity of perhaps 60,000 tonnes. The industry has been 
badly hit by the post 1974 collapse of copper prices and is 
operating at a loss. Otjihase has been closed after the 
failure of attempts to sell it to Tsumeb. Development at 
existing mines as well as on proved or semi proved new 
prospects is at a low level. The Falconbridge and Jo’nnies 
(Johannesburg Consolidated) units pose the same political 
problems as Rossing and Langer Heinrich - they were 
developed after the Mandate's revocation.
Lead (up to 75,000 capacity including concentrates - probably
70.000 tonne smelter capacity at Tsumeb) and zinc (about
25.000 tonne metal equivalent, all exported as concentrate) 
are largely produced by Tsumeb in association with copper. 
Other significant producers are ISC0R (South African state 
corporation) and SWAC0 (South West Afirca Company).
Other minor mineral products include germanium, cadium, 
lithium, tin, silver, wolfram (exported wholly or largely as 
concentrates) and salt. Proven reserves of limestone exist 
as well as a plan and design for a cement plant but, like 
exploitation of several copper, lead, zinc and minor metal 
ore bodies, this has been held up by the onset of 
transition to independence.
Prospects for coal and iron ore are unclear; certainly 
deposits exist but their size, quality and technical 
composition are not adequately known. While known petro­
leum prospecting results have not shown oil nor proven the 
viability of gas, the geological prospects are promising 
and the present absence of major international company 
interest probably relates to political as much as 
geological uncertainty.
Independent Namibia does not - in its first few years - need 
major new prospecting or development beyond completion of 
Langer Heinrich. Its requirements are to keep the existing 
sector operating, raise the Namibian share in surplus, 
acquire a substantial strike in ownership and control, sort 
out the morass of formal and substantive invalidity or 
illegality surrounding post 1966 mines and contracts, lay 
the groundwork for rapid Namibianization of middle and 
senior level positions, end the "'contract"' system and 
provide fully adequate wages, family housing and trade 
union rights.
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X
INDUSTRIALISATION: THE SECONDARY SECTOR
Manufacturing
Namibian industry is dominated by export processing (Tables 
15, 17). About half of the 7.5% of GDP accounted for by 
manufacturing is from fish tinning, mealing and oil 
extraction and meat packing and tinning plus a tin factory. 
This is a decline from the early 1970s because of a fall in 
the fish catch and resultant 60% or more underutilization of 
capacity„
The balance of manufacturing consists of such activities as 
brewing, maize milling, sawmilling, printing and publishing, 
transport equipment maintenance and repair. Even such 
fairly standard activities as wheat flour milling, petroleum 
refining, textiles spinning and weaving and cement 
production are absent. This partly relates to the small 
market size ( made smaller by unequal income distribution) 
and partly to the fact that Namibian industry would to date 
have no protection against South African production.
Because the Republic 's manufacturing is highly cartelized, 
a new entrant would probably face predatory competition while 
a cartel member would usually have little incentive'to 
upset the arrangements by opening a new plant in Namibia.
The larger units are South African owned - via the Republic 
subsidiary of the UK parent in the case of Metal Box - the 
smaller ones settler owned. Three firms dominate fish 
processing. South African breweries own the brewery;- three 
firms dominate meat packing and tinning. Anglo-American 
accounts for a high proportion of manufacturing - especially 
in fish and meat processing - through a number of its 
industrial subsidiary and associated companies. Apart from 
Anglo, Metal Box, and a minor Standard Telephone cable plant, 
TNC's do not seem to be prominent in this sector.
Independence will create both pressures and opportunities to 
alter this pattern. Some of the more probable areas include:
a. further development of meat packing and tinning to 
handle the 60-80% of exported cattle now shipped live 
to South Africa;
b. a tanning and leather goods industry based on cattle 
hides and goat plus non-karakul sheepskins as well as 
some pre-export processing karakul pelts and wool;
c. further smelting capacity plus a copper refinery and 
perhaps a development of the present small electric 
wire and cable plant (oddly based on imported 
refined copper and Republic markets );
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d. garments and other labour intensive broad market 
consumer goods industries geared to Namibian demand;
e. if agricultural production can be diversified, 
agri-industrial manufacturing for Namibian markets
e.g. cotton textiles, cigarettes, sisal sacks, sugar;
f. construction materials starting with a cement plant - 
a R42 million 250,000 tonne plant was carried to 
design stage in 1978-79 and postponed for uncertainty 
rather than general viability reasons - and including 
some metal fabrication plus more basic equipment 
repair and spare parts fabrication.
Beyond this very general list it is not now possible to 
project. What opportunities exist in light engineering and 
chemicals supplying ranching, mining and/or other sectors is 
not clear. Similarly the opportunities for producing 
consumer goods for regional exports will remain uncertain 
technically, economically and politically until some time 
after independence.
With independence Namibia is almost certain to adopt an 
independence tariff system with no preference for South 
African goods. However, its early use is likely to be 
fiscal more than protective until special cases for 
selective protection are demonstrated.
Construction
Construction is dominated by three large South African 
based contractors, one South African based construction 
machinery firm and the direct labour sections of the 
territorial ministry of works and of three South African 
state corporations (railways, posts and telecommunications, 
power). They probably encompass three quarters of the 
sector 's 4-5% contribution to QDP. Ihe balance is handled 
by small local contractors and household construction of 
own homes. The limited supply of building materials - sand 
and gravel, some timber from the Oshakati mill - has 
already been noted.
The sector will need major restructuring at independence 
for five reasons :
1. none of the existing major units is self contained - 
all use planning and design capacity and usually 
skilled personnel and equipment from Republic parent 
units - a pattern unlikely to be acceptable to 
Namibia or the Republic;
2 . the government and state corporation units are likely 
to lose most of their locally based senior personnel
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and possibly equipment.
3. the new state's different priorities will require an
enhanced buildings and works programme;
4. reuniting households with the end of contract and 
minimum upgrading of shack housing will require 
construction of living units for at least 150,000 
urban, mine and ranch households;
5. major irrigation works and/or railway upgrading/ 
port expansion to service Botswana will require major 
specialized capacity.
The fourth and fifth issues require separate approaches. 
Providing access to skill upgrading (especially for small 
team foremen), finance and materials should allow ranch, 
mine and neighbourhood groups to do a significant share of 
home construction and also create a small scale African 
construction team base households could hire to build low 
to middle cost housing. Large specialized contracts, on 
the other hand, will need to go to international tender 
(or negotiation) for some years.
Medium scale building and civil engineering (and major 
maintenance) will require Namibian firms. These may 
i nitially need to be joint ventures with foreign firms 
or - in the case of government and parastatal units - 
initially dominantly expatriate managed. International 
tender is not feasible on contracts of this size and a 
totally foreign owned sector - apart from a South African 
owned one - would be almost as hard to create initially as 
a joint venture/technical assistanceone and harder to use 
as a vehicle for promoting employment of Namibian materials 
and designs and upgrading of Namibian skills.
XI
SERVICES ANT) INFRASTRUCTURE: THE TERTIARY SECTOR 
The Present and Its Limits
The existing services sector has four main roles - handling 
exports, distributing imports, meeting the demand of the 
upper income European community, handling the civil side of 
keeping the African “in his place“ (both literally and 
figuratively).
That this pattern will not be satisfactory to an independent 
Namibia is clear enough. Except with respect to the fourth 
role what needs to be or can be done is less clear. Changing 
the structure of production is a precondition for reducing 
the share of services supporting export production and
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import distribution. Indeed most of the present infra­
structure is broadly suitable for a more nationally oriented 
production structure if one is achieved. Until that happens 
it is critical to keep exports and imports moving.
Even after its reduction in size, the expatriate community 
will be significant in size and relatively affluent.. To 
the extent it uses private sector services the supply will 
also have fallen with departures. There may be approximate 
balance and in any event it is hard to imagine either 
forcing closure of hairdressers or bothering with tourist 
parks and luxury restaurants can have any particular priority 
during the first years of independence. The tourist 
industry - largely South African and German (relatives of 
settlers?) in clientele will probably disintegrate on both 
the supply and demand sides. Whether this sectoral closure 
is a good thing or not is somewhat irrelevant, the personnel 
and institution creation (or partner negotiation) needed 
to preserve a significant tourist industry have much more 
urgent uses.
Segrated public facilities clearly will be integrated.
That will not - in the cases of health, water and housing 
- reduce the per capita expatriate use and is a general 
strategy imperative not a detailed service sector 
restructuring proposal. In the case of education either a 
special school or schools for children of expatriates or - 
probably better - benign approval of foreign community 
run and financed schools for expatriate children will need 
to be considered. Both have proven reasonably workable and 
moderately conflict free,at least for a long interim period, 
in Tanzania.
Priority Issues
The immediate priorities specifically relating to services 
are likely to lie elsewhere. Ihey relate to finance, 
external trade, internal distribution, transport and basic 
public services.
In each case the first problem will be to avert disinte­
gration of the existing system but also to achieve either 
significant structural changes or additions or both.
The most critical public services are education, Urbanization, 
agricultural sector support and health. The first three 
have been sketched in relation to personpower, natural 
resources and industrialisation. Health requires not 
dismantling the existing hospitals - as opposed to removing 
racial barriers at their doors - but in adding mass oriented 
preventitive medicine, environmental sanitation, mother and 
child care, rural health center and dispensary/first aid 
post elements to create an integrated, universally accessible
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national system. Experience in Tanzania, Mozambique and 
SWAPO's own programmes in Zambia, Angola and the semi­
liberated areas should provide a foundation from which to 
build.
Finance and External Trade
If the new state is to achieve a reasonable degree of econo­
mic control - or indeed to avert chaos - it will be forced 
to establish a dominant position in both finance and external 
trade.
An economy as open as Namibia's can hardly be planned or 
managed in the absence of such instruments. In the case of 
Namibia,there is the more urgent concern that continued use 
of the rand and of South African financial and external 
trade firms is clearly unsatisfactory and may well prove 
impossible.
The critical financial institution is a central bank - one 
which is completely lacking today. Assuming a desire to 
achieve a reasonable degree of economic control for the 
state and a need to economise on instirutions its functions 
might include:
1. currency issue, government debt issue and management, 
foreign reserve management;
2. foreign exchange budgeting (including exchange 
control, transfer price monitoring and - to the degree 
necessary - import licensing);
3. domestic credit budgeting (including target level
setting and management);
4. regulation of financial institutions including
powers and capacity to ensure they implement credit 
and foreign exchange plans;
5. data collection and analysis as well as research
capacity in areas relevant to the Bank's other 
functions.
The evident model is the Bank of Tanzania but, in fact, the 
South African central bank has and uses the majority of 
these powers. Planning, training, recruiting expatriates 
for and activating a central bank on these lines will be an 
arduous, albeit feasible, task and if decided on will 
require early priority attention.
With such a central bank, the existing commercial banks - in 
particular Standard and Barclays if they shifted their 
Namibian subsidiaries from being responsible to South 
African units to reporting direct to London head offices -
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might be useable at least for an interim period. Joint 
venture and/or "fadeout" arrangements might be negotiable.
Development banks - perhaps one for agriculture, one for 
housing and one for other sectors - will be needed but 
perhaps less urgently. Term loans from banks and government 
budget equity or long term debt provisions might prove a 
viable interim solution. In the absence of any truly 
territorial insurance company, a national one (perhaps as a 
joint venture with an Indian or experienced African 
national insurance company) appears to have some priority.
External trade requires restructuring as well as gap 
filling. On the export side a metals, a livestock products 
and a fish products corporation are needed. In the case of 
metals,price monitoring to limit transfer pricing might be 
adequate initially but a sole export selling unit on the 
lines of Zambia's single channel copper export firm,
Memaco, which buys from the mines and resells abroad would 
seem to deserve careful study especially in respect to 
private or foreign managed joint venture mines. The live­
stock corporation will need to identify and to secure new 
markets for beef and advise on the required processing 
facilities. In the case of karakul,it should probably 
bypass the South African based firms to sell direct at the 
major European auctions. The fish products company, some­
what similarly, would need to identify and develop direct 
sales of tinned fish, fish oil and fish meal to industrial 
economy markets - almost certainly a less difficult task 
than in the case of beef.
In the case of imports,specialized products in the hands of 
established firms - e.g. petroleum products, vehicles, mine 
supplies and machinery - can probably be counted on to pose 
few urgent problems beyond institution of price monitoring. 
For basic commodities - in particular food, pharmaceuticals, 
agricultural imports, construction materials - the 
situation is likely to be different.
These products are at present imported almost 100% from the 
Republic and either by South African firms or by small local 
firms with little experience in locating non-South African 
sources. The continuation of concentrated dependence on 
Republic sources would be politically costly, economically 
a gamble both as to cost and as to certainty and politically 
economically likely to increase the new state's levels of 
vulnerability and uncertainty. Therefore, creating an 
import location, purchase and procurement capacity in a 
limited list of key products will probably need to be on the 
priority list for the services sector.
Domestic commerce will also require at least some attention. 
Marketing of agricultural exports from the ranch on is state 
regulated and either state or private oligopoly managed.
No new private sector firms are likely to spring up so that 
the domestic as well as the export side will need to be
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handled by the specialist companies.
The same may be true of essential imports, e.g. food, 
medicine, farm supplies. At the least, standby wholesale 
and distribution capacity should be designed and probably run
in on at least part of the business to serve as one form of
price control.
If new agricultural sources are to be encouraged and tapped, 
then again it may be necessary to provide some link between 
producing units and urban markets. Ranchers and peasants
have little experience in this field and the existing
commercial sector not much more.
Retail trade - beyond technical assistance (e.g. training 
of personnel, accounting and auditing services) to retail 
cooperatives springing from genuine neighbourhood, village, 
workplace or production unit member initiatives, is unlikely 
to be an appropriate early priority. Some retailers will 
stay, some African ones will expand, many new ones are 
likely to set up in business. A vacuum is unlikely. 
Centralized state trading at retail level poses very serious 
problems and has a poor record in Africa even in cases in 
which import/export/wholesale state trading has been 
relatively efficient. Genuinely locally based retail 
cooperatives have a better record but require time to 
become established and to multiply.
Transport and Communications
The nature of the problems affecting this sector have been 
noted. They include: .South African based equipment likely
to be driven, hauled or flown away; lack of planning, 
central management and heavy repair facilities; a high 
proportion of expatriate (as opposed to settler) personnel 
employed by .South African state or private units and likely 
to be recalled.
Interim plans for keeping the service going and longer term 
ones for consolidating and institutionalizing would appear 
to deserve high priority. Ihey will need to encompass 
training, recruitment, vehicle/rolling stock/plane replace­
ment, gap filling (e.g. repair units, planning units) and 
institutional design. The railways, ports, road transport, 
air transport and posts/telecommunications sectors require 
separate sub-plans. One is believed to exist in draft form 
- and with its training component begun - in the case of 
posts and telecommunications.
Port Facilities
A special problem relates to the main harbour, fishing base 
and industrial town - Walvis Bay. South Africa may seek to
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keep this territory on the basis that it was part of Cape 
Province before Germany colonized Namibia. The validity of 
this claim is debateable - for over half a century the 
Republic administered Walvis Bay as part of Namibia, dis­
mantled the main German port at9wakopmund and built Walvis 
Bay from a village to a substantial town integrally part 
of the Namibian economy.
An independent Namibia can hardly use a South African 
enclave as its main external transit route. If it developed 
workable - even if interim and/or costly - alternatives, 
South Africa would probably leave Walvis Bay. Without 
Namibian traffic and blocked from fishing by Namibian 
territorial waters, the enclave would be expensive and 
pointless.
However, that scenario requires that Namibia develop at 
least interim port capacity. The main possibilities are: 
Swakopmund, Luderitz, Por Alexandre (or Mocamedes), a 
new deepwater port (e.g. Cape Cross or Hentiesbaii). 
Swakopmund is a relatively unprotected roadstead with a 
decrepit pier. It is on the main rail line, was once a 
significant port, has a dredgeable bottom.
Caissons (or old ships filled with ballast and sunk) to 
create a breakwater, a new jetty, lighters and floating 
cranes could turn it into a useable interim facility. The 
problems with Luderitz are more intractable. It is far 
south of the main sources and destinations of cargo, on a 
low capacity rail line, with rocky bottom close in shore 
albeit with a protected deep water anchorage.
The Angolan ports are both several hundred miles from the 
Grootfontein railhead. The roads to Mocamedes - which has 
better port facilities are better than those to the less 
developed Porto Alexandre, but it is also considerably 
further. A substantial lorry fleet - say 250-300 twenty 
five tonne capacity articulated vehicles - would be required 
to handle 200,000 tonnes of cargo a year.
An artificial port could be built at Cape Cross (which has 
some natural protection) or Hentiesbaii (which has none). 
Indeed both were surveyed when the Republic was studying a 
heavy duty rail line for export of Wankie (Southern 
Rhodesia) coal in the 1960s. Either would require either 
a new rail line down from the plateau or a coastal line 
up from Swakopmund. Costs would total at least £200 million 
for port and rail works.
Swakopmund redevelopment, enhanced use of Luderitz and 
handling northern Namibian traffic via Porto Alexandre or 
Mocamedes almost certainly is feasible. It would lead to 
delays and raise costs but an independent Namibia would 
probably accept this if South Africa sought to hold on to 
Walvis Bay.
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XII
SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATION 
The Colonial Model
Occupied Namibia has been integrated into the Republic 
economy as a source of export earnings, surplus, beef and 
fishmeal and as an outlet for ranchers, middle and high 
level manpower and manufactured goods. Unlike other 
countries in the region, Namibia does not ''export" any 
substantial number of workers to the Republic - indeed 
the net flow is the other way with substantial European and 
"Cape Coloured" flows to Namibia.
This integration is almost totally artificial. The 
transport link to Cape Town by rail is an economic absurdity. 
The same is true of exports and imports channelled via the 
Republic. The common tariff protects South Africa not 
Namibia. The common currency and financial institutions 
channel foreign exchange and savings to the Republic. There 
is no case for the present concentration of expatriates and 
firms from any one country. That is quite apart from 
objections specific to South Africa. Some trade would have 
been rational, but the gearing of the beef industry, the 
compulsory low price fish meal sales, the two thirds of 
total imports originating in the Republic - are far above 
the levels economic or geographic considerations would have 
built up between independent states and firms engaging in 
arms length transactions.
The reverse holds of economic integration between Namibia and 
its other neighbours. With Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana 
they have been and remain negligible to the point of non 
existence. With Angola they were building up during the last 
years of Portugese colonialism - the Kunene scheme like 
Cahora Basa was part of the South African attempt to bolster 
the staying power of Portugal in Africa via major investment 
projects also directly useful to the Republic. Since 
Angola 's independence,relations have ranged from armed 
hostility to open - if undeclared - war.
This absence of integration makes equally little economic or 
geographic sense. Water, power and transport development do 
afford substantial areas in which integration of Namibian 
efforts with one or more of its neighbours is either 
potentially valuable or literally essential. Personpower 
development and potentially trade and production coordination 
also appear to provide scope for mutually beneficial action.
With independence there will clearly be a decline of 
Namibian subordinate integration into the Republic economic
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zone and attempts to build up selective integration with 
its African neighbours. Some aspects of the probable 
disengagement from South Africa have already been touched on. 
Potential for increased links with Angola, Botswana,
Zimbabwe and Zambia in the fields of water and power, 
transport and communication, personpower development, trade 
and production can be sketched as a basis for more detailed 
study.
Water and Power
The Kunene River's development requires a broad, long term 
agreement between Namibia and Angola. Caleuque and any 
future reservoir and pumping stations are in Angola while 
Ruacana Falls and any subsequent dams cross the international 
boundary and should logically be developed to feed both the 
Namibian and the Southern Angolan power grids.
Negotiating use of Caleuque and allowed interim offtake 
levels will be urgent to an independent Namibia to allow 
proper control of water flow to Ruacana and to inaugurate 
irrigation in the north. A permanent Kunene waters division 
and power development agreement can be negotiated over a 
longer term. Since Angola has more water in its south than 
it needs and would benefit by joint power development, no 
major problem of principle should hamper agreement.
Okavango rises in Angola, transits Namibia, and sinks into 
the Okavango Swamp in Botswana where it potentially affords 
a major asset for arable and livestock farming development 
in a country almost as water short as Namibia. Again 
national interests appear compatible. Angola can guarantee 
a large cross border flow without limiting its own future 
agricultural development; Namibia probably can use only 
limited volumes of Okavango water for geographical reasons; 
safeguarding its future reservoir is key to Botswana but is 
compatible with substantially greater Angolan and Namibian 
future drawing on the river.
In the east (Eastern and Central Caprivi) both irrigati^f 
and drainage will affect Botswana and Zambia,albeit it is 
difficult to envisage that it would either limit their 
probable future use or create flood problems (the drainage 
would probably end by increasing the Okavango's flow).
However agreements are needed, especially as in some areas 
joint development on both sides of the rivers might afford 
economies to the states concerned.
Transport and Ocmmunication
Namibia has no normal road or rail links with independent 
African states. The shortest and most urgent link is 
probably a 30-50 mile one from Katima Mulilo in the Caprivi
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(on a heavy duty military highway from the Grootefontein 
railhead) to intersect the Lusaka-Livingstone highway in 
Zambia and thus link with routes to Botswana and Zimbabwe. 
The logical route - except for the ferry or bridge - is 
entirely in Zambia, but given Zambia's current financial 
plight Namibian or international finance would appear 
appropriate.
Links with Angola may depend more on providing ferries and 
on Angolan roads than on Namibian action. The last few 
years have seen the development of a military road grid in 
the North which does reach the frontier at several points.
A special case arises if theRepublic remains in occupation 
of Walvis Bay. While the main short term alternative port 
facility would need to be a resurrected Swakopmund harbour. 
Hie problem is neither Namibian roads nor port capacity 
but doubts as to the condition of the main highway to 
Mocamedes and the low quality of both the shorter Ruacana - 
Porto Alexandre road and of Porto Alexandre's facilities.
Botswana - Namibia links would be useful to Namibia by 
giving access to alternative sources of coal for smelting - 
currently 100,000 tonnes a year. They would also give more 
direct access to Zimbabwe than via Zambia. However, the 
dominant concern here will be Botswana's. Botswana's 
development of coal, Sua Pan soda ash, agriculture near 
the Okovango delta and the western copper deposits requires 
a heavy duty rail line direct to an uncongested port. The 
logical link - on which a preliminary study has been done 
on the Botswana side - is probably Selibwe-Phikwe to Sua to 
Maun to the Ngami Ridge and thence to the Namibian railhead 
at Gobabis. The link of course is dependent on Namibia's 
recovering Walvis Bay or building a new deepwater port. It 
will require upgrading the Walvis Bay-Windhoek and rebuilding 
the Windhoek GDbabis lines and erecting specialist bulk 
mineral facilities at Walvis Bay,
Telecommunications may be an area for partial integration 
with Zambi a or Botswana. Present external traffic is routed 
via the Republic. A ground station for satellite trans­
mission/reception is needed. While not inordinately 
expensive, use of a Zambian or Botswanan station linked by 
microwave might lower Namibian capital costs and provide a 
useful revenue source for the neighbour state's station.
Namibia is unlikely to inherit an airline except on paper.
Its immediate national priorities are likely to be domestic 
service and perhaps - depending on what can or cannot be 
negotiated with foreign airlines - air cargo service to 
Europe (beef, uranium oxide, karakul skins, diamond out; 
spare parts, machinery, high value consumer goods in). 
Regionally links to Angola, Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, 
Botswana, Zimbabwe are needed and unlikely to be provided
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adequately by European carriers. Negotiation to secure 
extension of services by the relevant national carriers, a 
joint airline with Botswana (if it were to decide to adopt 
a more active airline policy) or a Namibian Airline in 
conjunction with a European carrier (Like the early SAS-Thai 
relationship)operating a negotiated regional service pattern 
would appear more practical than a full scale, 100% Namibian 
international airline.
Ooastal shipping is not likely to be of great significance. 
However, if Nigeria could be induced to route some of its 
vessels via Walvis Bay and Luanda (presumably also Matadi, 
Pointe Noire, Port Gentil and/or Douala) that would create 
the potential for coastal trade over the Walvis Bay-Lagos 
range as well as an additional service to Europe. Similarly 
the East African National Shipping Line (which includes 
Zambia) might be induced to consider operating some services 
via Maputo or Windhoek instead of via the Canal - thus 
providing transport for trade with the Maputo-Mombasa range. 
The economics are somewhat uncertain and it might be 
feasible only if Namibia decided to seek membership in EANSL.
Personpower Development
Initially the tertiary and specialized secondary education 
capacity of independent Namibia will be very low. in the 
short run negotiating for places at facilities in its 
neighbours (particularly Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and 
specialized institutions in Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique) 
could increase the speed with which broadened training of 
citizens within Africa is achievable.
In the medium and long term,Namibia will need to decide 
what facilities to provide at home and which to seek abroad. 
For example, Namibia is hardly likely ever to need a 
forestry faculty at technical or university level. Should 
it negotiate a long term entry quota at Dar es Salaam? Seek 
to be involved in providing faculty and in meeting costs 
beyond payment of fees at such a faculty? In the case of 
mining, some facilities in Namibia can be justified but in the 
medium term an agreement with Zambia to make a joint 
approach internationally for funds and personnel to expand 
UNZA's School of Mines and Northern College of Technology 
to accommodate Namibian needs would appear desirable.
Similar concerns apply in other areas including health (Dar 
medical faculty?), water and hydraulic engineering, 
fisheries and marine biology (Dar?), crop husbandry (UNZA, 
Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Dar?). In the veterinary field, Namibia 
needs substantial facilities but might find specialization 
in certain areas or levels of training jointly with Botswana 
(i.e. Botswanan students in Namibia as well as vice versa) 
desirable. Over a long time period the same might well hold 
true of mining.
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Trade
Namibia's short term potential exports to the region are 
limited but not non-existent: tinned fish, fishmeal (for
animal food), butter and cheese (of which Zambia at least 
is a not negligible importer), possibly some electrical 
and telecommunications cable. Realistically the amount 
could hardly exceed 1% of Namibia's exports (say £2.5-4 
million fish, £1-2 million fishmeal, £0.5-1 million butter 
and cheese and £2 million other) but it could be a 
starting point for building up a balanced two way trade 
expansion with other Southern African Countries.
Zambia and Zimbabwe are logical source of maize for 
Namibia. Both have had exportable surpluses: which they 
found hard to realize. Given a road link to Zambia, maize 
could be transported to Namibia at lower cost than to 
most other destinations. However, the Zambian collection 
and dispatch system has, in the past, proven weaker than 
production, and an independent Zimbabwe may face an 
interim grain deficit, so that joint agreement on timing 
of delivery and method of transport (conceivably a joint 
lorry venture taking 500-1000 tonnes a week) would be 
needed before Namibia could feel secure in placing the 
bulk of its normal 50,000 tonne requirement on one or two 
multi year bulk contracts. If Mauritius, Tanzania or
Swaziland sugar can be shipped at reasonable cost, e.g. by
EANSL, it is a logical replacement for South African.
Manufactured goods imports which might be procured region­
ally fall into two clusters. The first e.g. cement, 
galvanized sheet, fertilizers, petroleum products, 
textiles, garments, cigarettes are readily identifiable 
and needed in moderate to large quantities. There are 
problems in locating a regional state with surplus 
capacity albeit in the case of garments this does
currently apply to Zambia. Angola may be able to export
cement, galvanized sheet and some petroleum products 
depending on how near to capacity it can operate its 
plants. Zimbabwe might be able to export cigarettes, 
galvanized sheet, garments and Tanzania garments, textiles 
and cigarettes.
The second group of manufactured goods imports are those 
with more variety, more problems of detailed specification 
and identification and lower unit orders. For most goods 
the problem will be determining what goods of what 
specification at what price are available where with what 
certainty of delivery by the seller and of transport to 
Namibia. Special attention to this information problem 
will be needed, otherwise Namibia will tend to import 
from Europe or Asia because it is easier to determine 
sources, specifications and prices and less hard to 
estimate delivery dates even if African sources would in 
fact be cheaper. A special case is hoof and mouth 
vaccine where the new Botswana laboratory is the logical
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- indeed ,probably the only suitable - supplier.
Production
Broader trade build up over time will depend on formal or 
informal coordination of production development. While not 
essential, multiyear contracts would assist this process as, 
in certain cases, would joint ventures.
On the Namibian side possible areas include:
a. fibre sacks (from century plant, sisal or an
intermediate plant);
b. electric and telecommunications wire and cable 
(from expanding the existing Standard Telephone 
plant);
c. woollen blankets (from local wool);
d. leather, shoes, other leather products (based on
existing hides exports and a greater volume of loeal 
slaughter);
e. some heavy maintenance and spare parts fabrication 
for railway rolling stock (assuming a rail link to 
Botswana);
f. seme spare parts for mining machinery (based on a 
local foundry industry geared to servicing the mining 
sector);
g. some checicals possibly including explosives (again 
based on capacity designed to service mining);
h. lead pipes and forged products (if production 
basically for export is viable);
i. cardboard boxes and cartons (related to production 
to service the fish canneries);
j. cotton textiles (tied to planning a 25-40 million
metre mill instead of the 20 million one needed to 
meet Namibian demand);
k. animal vaccines (related to 20 million or more dose a
year plant needed to maintain present level of vete­
rinary service).
The buildup of significant export capacity would take several 
years. This is especially true since, except for the lead 
pipe, leather and leather products cases, the primary target 
market would be Namibian. A broader market planned for in 
advance could even in these cases allow economies of scales 
and lower prices domestically as well as on export sales.
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Overall Approach and Priorities
Hie total list of potential regional integration projects is 
substantial. Most are bilateral not regionwide. The nature 
of the key items suggests that attempts to create a Regional 
Economic Community would be premature and to float a free 
trade zone counterproductive. However, the number and 
potential volume suggest that a small, permanent interstate 
economic coordination commission with a small technical staff 
and sectoral committess for state officials (ministers) 
involved in actual joint action in the sectors might be 
valuable.
The most urgent areas appear to be: Kunene water/power;
Katimo Mulilo - Zambia Highway road; maize import arrange­
ments; sement import arrangements; systematic placing of 
Namibian students in specialized secondary and tertiary 
institutions.
The largest, if they materialize, would be Okavango and Kunene 
water/pcwer development; Botswana - Walvis Bay rail line; 
the joint production possibilities taken as a group.
The two main themes of Southern African Development Coordin­
ation from a Naminian viewpoint will be:
1. reduction of concentrated, unilateral economic 
dependence on the Republic of South Africa, including 
building a set of replacement links among the 
independent states of the region;
2. facilitating structural change consistent with 
development„
In this respect, the likely Namibian concerns are consistent 
with the stance taken by the Southern African Development 
Coordination Conference held by the Front Line States at 
Arusha in July 1979. The coordination is envisaged as 
including all genuinely independent states; as coordinating 
national efforts of two or more states rather than creating 
regional supranational units and as economizing on scare 
high level personnel by minimizing regional secretariats.
XIII
EXTERNAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
The Occupation Pattern
Under South African occupation Namibia has been treated as a 
colony - and a closed colony at that. Therefore, official 
bilateral or multilateral aid or technical assistance in 
Namibia is notable by its complete absence. Some voluntary
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agency (largely church related) assistance in personnel and 
finance does exist in respect to education, health, social 
services and defence of Namibians against the regime but 
numbers and amounts are small.
South African provides the bulk of the public sector personnel. 
It is very hard to divide these between South Africans 
serving in Namibia basically as expatriates and "Sudwesters" 
with a territorial feeling of commitment. In any event the 
recurrent revenue derived from Namibia exceeds recurrent 
expenditure in Naminia (excluding that of the South African 
military forces) so that they do not constitute technical 
assistance.
Ihe South African state has invested on the order of Rl,500 
million directly and via state corporations in Namibia. Part 
has been de facto covered by current revenue/expenditure 
surpluses but most has not been recovered in that way to date. 
Whether this can be seen as aid to Namibia - let alone 
Namibians - is a different matter. The highly inegalitarian, 
export oriented, foreign exchange and investible surplus 
generating economy of Namibia was created to benefit South 
Africa and has done so. What real subsidies there have been 
- e.g. in the 1930s and 1940s, and again in the late 1970s 
to ranchers - were to benefit South Africans in "Sudwest" not 
Namibia or Namibians.
The Liberation Movement
SWAPO has received modest amounts of multilateral (United 
Nations' Agencies and programmes), bilateral (e.g. Scandi­
navian, Yugoslav, OMEA member) and voluntary agency (e.g. 
church bodies) assistance. The range of sources and types 
of programmes is wide but total amounts of funds and goods 
and especially of personnel are quite small.
Moreover, this experience is also less than directly relevant 
to an independent Namibia. Three of the four components of 
cooperation - military, refugee, indirect training, direct 
training - are special, the first two to a revolutionary 
guerilla war and the third to the somewhat curious inter­
national legal status which makes the United Nations' Gouncil 
for Namibia, in some sense, a de jure government.
As a result, SWAPO has been able to build up contacts with 
potential sources of technical assistance but has relatively 
little experience in developing overall programmes for 
drawing on them for personnel development and still less for 
civil government programme planning or support.
Transitional Period
In the transition from occupation through interim administration
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to independence, Namibia will need very substantial flows of 
technical, material and financial assistance. Exactly how 
much of what types from whom depend on the decisions of the 
new Namibian state. It will also be influenced by the degree 
to which South Africa chooses to cooperate with, or to seek 
to destabilize, Namibia.
It seems rational to assume that independent Namibian govern­
ment will seek to keep or ot hire at least 15,000 expatriates 
(Tables 8, 9) because of the technical complexity of key 
sectors of the economy and the very limited number of trained 
Namibians.
Three subsidiary assumptions also seem reasonable:
a. many private sector European personnel - particularly 
in mining - will stay or be replaced by their 
employers;
b. South Africa may be willing to second government and
cooperation personnel but no independent government 
can count on this especially as it is unclear what
quid pro quo (e.g. in respect to Walvis Bay or
"repayment" of South African state investment) would 
be sought;
c. at least the most senior and most critical posts for
which no Namibians are available will be filled by 
new expatriates whom the Namibian government will 
seek through technical assistance channels.
In addition a series of special physical/financial needs will 
or may arise:
a. arrangements for interim contract fishing and
replacement of the fishing fleet if - as seems very 
likely - its owners sail from Walvis to Table Bay;
b. emergency port development (for reactivating 
Swakopmund, enlarging Luderitz or reaching an Angolan 
port) if South Africa seeks to retain Walvis Bay
to nullify Namibian independence;
c. urgent supply of roads, air and rail transport 
equipment and maintenance facilities to replace those 
removed or made unavailable at independence by South 
Africans or South Africa (the basic lorry and bus as 
as well as rail services are by Republic corporations 
with heavy maintenance and headquarters facilities 
outside Namibia);
d. finance to allow the creation of a currency since 
continued use of the rand seems unlikely to be 
politically credible (or economically desirable) 
but a quick recovery from South Africa in respect of 
withdrawn rand seems equally unlikely;
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e. assistance in respect to providing supplies of key
imports (e.g. maize) and markets for key exports (e.g. 
beef) if relations with the Republic are such as to 
cause massive, early trade dislocation.
Special Characteristics
It is not for outsiders to instruct Namibia on how to 
coordinate its use of foreign services. Nor is it very 
profitable to guess at the specific format and timing of 
Namibian requests. However, it is worth noting several 
characteristics atypical of normal technical assistance;
a. the number of personnel - up to 7,500 - needed over
a brief buildup period (possibly as short as six 
months);
b. the probable need for complete teams to operate key
units (e.g. the three main power stations and the 
high tension grid if the South African power corpor­
ation withdraws its personnel);
c. the need for immediate provision of packages of
personnel and equipment (e.g. railway heavy 
maintenance) to plug gaps in the existing territorial 
structure or new ones created by South African 
withdrawal;
d. the great need for acting within weeks of requests
if severe damage is not to result - a need quite at 
variance with the normally leisurely course of 
bilateral (let alone multilateral) technical 
assistance recruitment;
e. the significant number of very senior posts which
at independence cannot be filled by Namibians but, 
equally, cannot be filled without Namibian involve­
ment in the selection process.
Capital assistance may prove to be tertiary in importance to 
technical and specific material assistance during the transit­
ion period, unless massive willful economic destabilization 
and wrecking is carried out by European settlers and foreign 
firms. If there is an orderly handover, following a United 
Nations supervised transition, then revenues for current 
expenditure and some capital spending should continue to 
flow. The immediate need is to keep production and services 
operating and to carry out critical reorientation of current 
government activities and of trade, not to start a crash 
public works programme. Indeed it is doubtful that an 
independent Namibia can draft even an interim capital plan 
until several months after independence.
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However, the cost of the technical assistance and material 
cooperation needed will be high. Further, if major disruption 
- e.g. ranchers killing or decamping with stock, fishing 
fleet sailing away, one or more major mines closing, South 
African refusal to provide records or personnel to keep tax 
collection flowing - occurs, interim funding for the recurrent 
budget will be needed.
Longer Term
CLtizenigation takes time. For at least a decade Namibia will 
need not insignificant numbers of expatriates. While it may 
choose to hire more directly, one would be wise to suppose 
that significant technical cooperation (including TCDC) will 
be sought for much longer than the transitional period.
Capital assistance will also be sought. Water development 
(power, large scale irrigation), railway extension (possibly 
in conjunction with Botswana), a new port of Walvis Bay 
remains South African occupied, mining development (assuming 
state participation in that sector) are among the larger and 
more self evident examples.
Barring a catastrophic transition to .independence or massive 
external destabilization, Namibia will not be among the 
poorest or most foreign exchange starved countries. Indeed it 
should be able to achieve - and an independent government 
would wish to achieve - substantial domestic savings and 
substantial foreign exchange from export earnings available 
for capital goods imports (Table 32). However, the costs 
of restructuring will be high - even though most such 
investment should have a relatively high pay off even in 
economic terms - so that substantial long term borrowing may 
be needed during the first decade of independence.
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TABLE 1
CENSUS BASED POPULATION ESTIMATES (1960-1980)
Census Based Pstlmat os
Northern Central/
1 3 4Year African Southern "Coloured" European Total
2African
1960
Census 238,047 110,695 58,771
1960
Primate5 320,000 122,500 60,000
1970
Census • 427,732 165,773
1975
Projec-. . 6 tion
1977
Projec-
• <5tion 
1980 
Projec-
78,096
497,5007 200,0007 92,500
532,5007 212,5007 100,000
tion 582,500 235,000 110,000
73,464 526,004
73,500 575,000
90,583 762,184
100,000® 890,000
102,500® 947,500
107,500 1,035,000
2
3
4
5
7
8
Persons of Ovambo, Kavango, Eastern Caprivi origin (data 
by geographic unit of residence not available).
All other African persons.
Nama, Rehoboth, "Cape Coloured" persons.
Afrikaans, German, English speaking communities including 
contract and short stay.
1970 Census Date adjusted backward to 1960 assuming popu­
lation growth rate actually about 2.9%.
Projections from 1970 Census using approximately 3%, 3.5% 
and 1.75% growth rates African, Coloured and European commun­
ities. (3.5% includes immigration, 1.75% includes change in 
number of expatriates except military forces.) 1980
projection for Europeans not meaningful if geniune indepen­
dence is achieved by that year.
Includes refugees outside Namibia.
Excludes post 1970 military occupation forces expansion.
NOTE: All data highly approximate and incomplete. Base
u s e d  i s  .1970 C e n s u s ,
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TABLE 2
ALTERNATIVE POPULATION ESTIMATES1
Year
Northern
African
Central
Southern
African
"Coloured" European Total
1970 
1977 
19803 
"1985-86"3
600,000
735.000
802,500
900.000
245.000
300.000
327,500
400.000
90,000
115.000
127,500
150.000
90,000
102,500
1,025,000
1,252,500
(30.000) 1,307,500
(50.000)4 1,500,000
Based on numberous informal estimates ranging from 1,000,000 
to 2,500,000 with most from Namibian sources in the 1,200,000 
to 1,500,000 range for mid 1970s. Also related to employ­
ment and labour force estimates.
1977 estimate adjusted backwards at 3.0% per annum for 
African, 3.5% for "Coloured", 1.75% for European communities.
1977-80 - "1985-86" pro-forma population growth estimates 
for African and "Coloured" communities 3.0% and 3.5% per annum. 
Actual shifts resulting from immigration from Angola,
Botswana, RSA are not subject to serious estimate.
Assumes 7,500 long term or citizen European households of 
an average size of 4 and 7,500 to 10,000 expatriate and 
volunteer households of an average size of about 3.
Estimate includes expatriates from Asia, Africa, Latin America 
as well as Europe.
NOTE: All estimates highly approximate.
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TABLE 3
POPULATION PROJECTIONS "1980 - 81", "1958 - 86"
A. Populat ion
Year Small 
agri.
Large 
agri.
Urban 
Non-Agri.
Total
19771
African/Coloured 
European
700,000 175,000
20,000
275,000 
82,500
1,150,000 
102,500
Total 700,000 195,000 352,500 1,252,500
"1980-81"2
Namibian
European/Expatriate
407,5004 275,0004 
3,000
575,OOO4 
47,000
1,257,500 
50,000
Total 407,500 278,000 622,000 1f 307,500
"1985-86"3
Namibian
European/Expatriate
375,000 350,000
3,000
725,000 
47,000
1,450,000
50,000
Total 375,000 358,000 772,000 1,500,000
B Namibian population shifts
(excluding Europeans)
Sector 1977 Finding - 
"Contract"
NaturaJ
Growth
0ther7
Moves
"1985 - 86"
Small
Agriculture 700,000 400,000 + 100,000 - 25,000 375,000
Large
Agriculture 175,000 + 100,000 ♦ 60,000 ♦ 15,000 350,000
Urban (Non- 
Agriculture 275,000 + 300,000 ♦ 140,000 ♦ 10,000 ->25,000
Total 1,150,000 - 300,000 - 1,450,000
C. Populat ion catoaories "1985 - 86"
(excluding Europeans)
Pre-school
Full time 
Students
Labou^
force Household10
Aged
Disabled Total
Male 200,000 150,000 325,000 - 40,000 715,000
Female 200,000 150,000 235,000 100,000 50,000 735,000
Total 400,000 300,000 550,000 100,000 90,000 1,450,000
1 See Table 2.
"I960 - 81" is a nominal year. What is intended is a "target" for the end of the first 
year of independence. The population is 1977 estimate plus 3JS a year growth.
^ "1905 - 86" is again a nominal year - in this case the target for the end of the sixth year 
(transition year plus five) in independence. The population is 1977 estimate plus 395 a 
year growth.
4 These projections assume most reuniting of households and some "other moves" have taken 
place but neither shift is complete.
5 Population shifts resulting from reuniting of households divided by "Contract/other migrant
labour regimes.
6 395 a year growth of population in sector adjusting for ending "contract" over 1980 - 85.
7 Other moves from one sector to another. Projections are net - gross would be somewhat 
higher.Q Very rough estimates. No usable demographic data appear to exist.
9 Full time equivalent numbers are used for part time large agriculture and urban (see Table 5) 
employment.
'l) Persons not ennarvd in any significant household income generating activity. (Individuals 
producing substantial food or housing for sel f-consunipt i on are included under "labour force" 
not "Household").
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TABLE 4
LABOUR FORCE ESTIMATES (1977)
Households^ Economical Active Persons
Group Total Small0 
Agri.
Largeq 
Agri.
Urban**
Individ­
ual mig­
rants
Small Large Urban Total9
Northern
African
147,000 127,OOO6 6,000 15,000 75,000 195,000 20,000 96,000 311,000
Central/
Southern
African
60,000 25,0O06 15,000 20,000 22,500 35,000 23,500 63,500 122,000
Coloured 23,000 8,000 5,000 10,000 12,500 10,000 6,500 32,000 48,500
European 30,000 - 6,5007 23,500 - - 6,500 30,000 36, 500
Total 260,000 160, OOO6 31,500 68,500 110,000 240,000 S6,SOOX) 221,500 518,000
10
Primary family units. Assumed average sizes 5 except for European estimated at about 
3.5 because of 50% short-term expatriate element.
All non-European ranching and farming as of 1977 falls in this class. Neither subsis­
tence nor traditional is an accurate term because some produce is sold (and more 
bought) and the present system is by no means the traditional pre-colonial one.
As of 1977 de facto the European ranching (and very secondarily farming) sector.
All non-agricultural activities classed here.
Workers who have base household units which remain in "small agriculture". Worker is 
single, short-term, outside home household. "Contract" labour is the dominant but not 
the only form. Official fishery labour which is seasonal.
Includes refugees outside Namibia.
Relates to household's basic economic activity residence in a substantial number of 
cases is urban.
Includes adults, children over 12 not in school of households in sector less migrants. 
Therefore includes de facto unemployed. (Adjusted from East African peasant sector data).
Implied labour force participation rates: 42.5% Coloured and Northern African: 40%
Central/Southern Agriculture sector.
Domestic service in Large Agriculture sector is rie facto omitted thereby understating 
total economically active population and Central/Southern African economically active 
relative to other groups.
NOTE: All estimates exceedingly approximate. No usable direct Small Agriculture data exist.
Data for other sectors are incomplete and out of date. Previous estimates all 
appear to understate both Small and Large Agriculture and (urban) Domestic Service 
by large margins.
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LABOUR FORCE PROJECTIONS TO "1985 - 8 6 "
A. Total Labour Force1 
Year Small Large Urban Total
TABLE 5
Agri. Agri. (Non-Afri)
19772
African/"Coloured" 240,000 50,000 191,500 481,500
European - 6,500 30,000 36,500
Total 240,000 56,500 221,500 513,000
"1980-81"3
Namibia 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 1 1 0 , 0 0 0 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 510,0005
European/Expatriate - 2 , 0 0 0 13,000 15,000
Total 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 1 1 2 , 0 0 0 213,000 525,000
"1985-86"4
Namibian 175,000 • 140,000 245,000 560,0006
European/Expatriate - 2 , 0 0 0 13,000 15,000
Total 175,000 142,000 258,000 575,000
B. Namibian Labour Force Calculation
"1985-86"
Small 
Agri.
Large
Agri.
Urban 
(Non-Afri)
Total
7Potential Labour Force
Male 85,000 85,000 155,000 325,000
Female 90,000 90,000 155,000 335,000
Total 175,000 175,000 310,000 660,000
QActual Labour Force
Male 85,000 85,000 155,000 325,0009Female
Full time 90,000 30,000 45,000 165,000
Half time - 1/2(50,000) 1/2(90,000) 1/2(140,000)
Total 175,000 140,000 245,000 560,000
Notes to Table 5
Includes "operf urban unemployed. Categorized by sector 
of employment not residence, i.e. rural resident engaged 
full time in construction is classed as Non-Agricultural 
(Urban) and full time farmer resident in a small town 
as Small or Large Agricultural.
See Note 1, Table 3.
See Note 2, Table 3.
See Note 3, Table 3.
Low growth 1977 to "1980-81" is caused by sectoral shifts 
and increased full time students.
As calculated part B, this table.
All persons over 12 minus full time students and aged, 
disabled (estimated at Table 3 - C).
In small agriculture calculated as equal to potential labour 
force. (See Note 8, Table 1.) In other sectors adjusted for 
part time or non-participation of women in labour force (see 
Note 10, Table 3).
Very rough estimates. These are markedly above any recorded 
female participation ratios in non-agricultural labour 
force in Africa (though not necessarily above West African 
probable actual ratios) and above present Namibian urban 
(non-agricultural) levels.
66
TABLE 6
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY ESTIMATES (1977)
Activity
Northern
African
Central/
Southern
African Coloured European
Total
1977
Thomas
19701
Small g 
Agriculture 195,000 35,000 1 0 , 0 0 0 _ 240,000 87,500
Large 3  
Agriculture 2 0 , 0 0 0 23,500 6 , 500 6 , 500 56,500 36,500
Fishing and Fish 
Processing 3,000 2 , 0 0 0 2 , 0 0 0 500 7, 500 7, 500
Mining 15,000 3,000 1 , 0 0 0 3, 500 22,500 18,000
Manufacturing, 4 
Electricity, Water 5, 500 2,250 2, 500 2,750 13,000 1 2 , 0 0 0
Con s t rue t ion 8 , 0 0 0 2,750 2,500 1,750 15,000 1 2 , 0 0 0
Transport, 
Communication 7,500 2, 500 1,500 1 , 0 0 0 12,500 11,500
Commerce & Finance6 10,500 6 , 500 3,000 5,000 25,000 19,500
Government 8 , 0 0 0 3,500 3,500 15,000 30,000 (25,000)
Domestic Service6 27,500 35,000 12,500 - 75,000 (8 ,0 0 0 )
Other7 1 , 0 0 0 1 , 0 0 0 1 , 0 0 0 500 3,500 (3,000)
3"Urban" Employment 1 0 , 0 0 0 5,000 2,500 - 17,500 (17,500)
Total 311,000 1 2 2 , 0 0 0 48,500 36,500 518,000 259,000
Agriculture
Total 215,000 58,000 16,500 6,500 296,500 124,000
Small
Agriculture (195,000) (35,000) (1 0 ,0 0 0) (-) (240,000) (87,500)
Large
Agriculture (2 0 ,0 0 0 ) (23,500) (6,500) (6,500) (56,500) (36,500)
Non-Agriculture
Total 96,000 63,500 32,000 30,000 221,500 135,000
Mining/Fishing (18,000) (5,000) (3,000) (4,000) (30,000) (25,500)
9Secondary Sectors (13,500) (5,000) (5,000) (4,500) (28,500) (24,000)
Tertiary Sectors (54,500) (48,500) (21,500) (21,500) (145,500) (67,000)
Unemployed (1 0 ,0 0 0) (5,000) (2,500) (-) (17,500) (17,500)
67
Notes to Table 6
1 W. H. Thomas’ 1970 estimates based on collection of scattered 
sectoral and enterprise is the best previously available source.
For urban sectors - unless otherwise noted - these estimates are 
built up from Thomas' estimates adjusted for later bits of micro 
data (e.g. 4,500 increase in mining employment related to Oamites, 
Otjihase and Rossing). Figures in ( ) are estimates in cases in
which Thomas’ sectorial division is not the same as that of this 
table. Subsequent 1977 estimates by Thomas are broadly consistent 
except for small agriculture and domestic service.
2 See note ® to Labour Force Estimates Table for method of estimation.
3 Assumes 5,000 to 8,500 ranch units with average 6 to 10 of employees 
(other than European owners and managers) per unit. Excludes
short term seasonal workers, i.e. 10 per ranch at 5,000 estimates 
and 6 at 8,500.
4 Includes fish tinning and fish meal production.
5 Includes non-European traders. Estimates as high as 12,500 have 
been made for this sector e g .  4,500 for Ovambo. However, it 
seems unlikely that those actually earning their basic household 
income from this sector can exceed 7,500-10,000. Overlaps 
exist with small agriculture, teachers, tribal officials.
6 Assumes 25,000 urban located European households with 3 domestic 
employees each. Previous estimates or order 7,500 appear absurdly 
low. Rural domestic employment not estimated (see note to 
Labour* Force Estimates Table).
7 Nominal estimates. Includes clergy.
8 Nominal estimates. Suggest 6 - 7 %  open unemployment among 
economically active in sectors other than small agriculture from 
Central/Southern African and Coloured communities and 8 - 9 %
Norther African. This may be "true" given numbers forced back
to "reserve" and nominally engaged in small scale agriculture. It 
is not, however, an estimate of numbers actively seeking urban 
sector jobs which is much higher - perhaps of the order of 60,000 - 
75,000 including 42,500 - 57,500 who are nominally or actually 
economically active in small agriculture.
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Notes to Table 6 (continued)
9 Manufacturing, water, electricity, construction.
10 Transport, communication, commerce, finance, government, 
domestic.
NOTE: All estimates are approximate. There are no usable
comprehensive official data. All estimates (including 
those of Thomas used as base for urban sector) are 
built up from fragmentary micro sectoral data plus 
rough estimation.
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OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY ESTIMATES (1977)
Category European Coloured African Total
TABLE 7
Managerial/Administrative1 9,700 250 1 0 0 1 0 , 0 0 0
(Including: Large Agriculture) 
(Other)
(5,000)
(4,700)
(-)
(250)
(-)
(1 0 0 )
(5.000)
(5.000)
Professional/Technical/Para
Professional2 lO,300 2,500 4, 250 17,000
(Including: Teachers (2,500) (800) (2,800) (6 ,1 0 0 )
Nurses (800) (1 ,0 0 0 ) (1 ,2 0 0 ) (3,000)
Mining (1,500) (50) (50) (1,600)
Other Engineering (1,500) (1 0 0 ) (50) (1,650)
Other production (2 ,0 0 0 ) (2 0 0 ) (50) (2,250)
Accounting (500) (2 0 0 ) (50) (750)
Other .(1,500) (150) (50) (1,650)
Clerical/Secretarial 2,500 1, 500 2 , 0 0 0 6 , OOO
Supervisory/Foremen 4,000 2 , 0 0 0 6 , 500 12,500
(Including: Large Agriculture) (1 ,0 0 0 ) (1 ,0 0 0 ) (3,500) (5,500)
(Other) (3,000) (1 ,9 0 0 ) (3,000) (7,000)
4Skilied-Non-Supervisory 3,000 1 , 0 0 0 1 , 0 0 0 5,000
Semi-skilled5 2, 500 7,500 40,000 50,000
(Including: Large Agriculture) (-) (3,500) (15,000) (18,500)
(Other) (2,500) (4,000) (25,000) (31,500)
"Unskilled" 6 2 , 0 0 0 8 , 0 0 0 80,000 90,000
(Including: Large Agriculture) (500) (2 ,0 0 0 ) (25,000) (27,000)
(Other) (1,500) (6 ,0 0 0 ) (55,000) (62,500)
7Domestic - 12,500 62,000 75,000
Small scale non-agricultural 
self-employment ® 2, 500 3,500 6 , 500 12,500
9Small agricultural - 1 0 , 0 0 0 230,000 240,000
Total
(Totals are rounded)
36,500 48,500 433,000 518,000
Notes to Tab1e 7
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1 Includes proprietors of large and middle sized businesses, 
middle and senior managers and civil servants.
2 Broadly defined. At para-professional and para-technical level 
division between this category and skilled or semi-skilled 
labour is a matter of choice.
3 Includes skilled and semi-skilled (but not professional or 
technical) who have significant supervisory or foreman duties.
4 Basically skilled artisans requiring over 18 months specialized 
formal training or in-service equivalent, e.g. linotype 
operators, senior mechanics.
5 Includes workers with specialized on-the-job acquired skills if 
inexperienced workers would be unable to perform job adequately 
with six months normal job experience, e.g. junior mechanics, 
herdsmen with responsibility for moving herds and/or lambing 
and calving.
6 Posts not requiring prior experience and satisfactorily per­
formed with six or less months normal job experience, e.g. 
sweepers, messengers, pick and shovel road workers.
7 Some workers highly skilled but not in general possessing skills 
transferable to other activities.
8 Small shops or service establishment not requiring specialized 
skills readily transferable to other activities, but requiring 
significant skills or experience not possessed by unskilled worker.
9 Some workers are highly skilled but the skills are not 
transferable to other activities.
NOTE: Estimates are built up from fragmentary data of different 
dates, sources, methods, reliability. As a result they are highly 
approximate. They are broadly consistent with Thomas' parallel 
estimates produced by a similar method but with more access to 
unpublished official data.
TABLE 8
SECTORAL PERSONPOWER RETIREMENT AT INDEPENDENCE ESTIMATES 
(High and Middle Level Oualification Personnel)*
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Sector Present 2Redundant New - New Present ^ New Namibians New to
Needs Total Europeans Expats. Tot al5 Post
Agriculture^ 10,000 1 ,ooo 1, 500 10,500 750 1,250 8, 500 4, 500
Fishing 1,000 NB7 - 1 .OOO TOO 250 650 150
Mining 5,000 - 100 5,100 2,500 500 2,100 1 ,ooo
Manu fac t u r i ng 3,000 750 250 2,500 1,000 500 1,000 500
Water Power 1,000 - 400 1,400 200 500 700 400
Construction 2,500 250 750 3,000 250 500 2,250 750
Transport 1,500 - 1,000 2,500 lOO 200 2,200 1, 200
Communications 750 - 250 1,000 50 450 500 350
Commerce 5,000 2,250 250 3,000 650 250 2,100 600
Finance 500 - 250 750 150 200 400 300
Other Services 1,750 250 250 1,750 500 - 1,250 250
oGovernment 18,000 8,000 12,500 22,50O10 1,250 2,700 18,550 12,000
Including 
Admin,9 (4,500) (4,000)
Education (6,500) (1,500)
Health (3,500) (1,000)
Agriculture (1,500) (500)
Other^1 (2,000) (1,000)
(250) (750) ( - )
(6,250) (11,250) (500)
(3,500) (6,000) (500)
(l.ooo) (2,000) (lOO)
(1,500) (2,500) (150)
(250) (SOO) (500)
1,250) (9,500) (6,000)
(500) (5,000) (3,000)
(400) (1,500) (1,000)
(300) (2,050) (1,500)
Total 50,000 12, 500 17,500 55,000 7, 500 7,500 40,000 22,000
1 Includes all managerial/administrative (10,000), professional/technical/para-professional (16,800), 2/3 
Supervisory/foreman 2/3 (8,250) skilled (4.750) plus 1/2 clerical/secretarial (3,250) and 1/7 semi-skilled 
(7,000). Cross estimated against sectoral data. (See Tables 4, 6).
2 Posts either inappropriate, unnecessary or non-priority in an rrdependent Namibia.
3 Posts relating to ptiority programme and institution req.j •r mrnts - see Sectoral Notes below for somewhat 
more detail.
4 Includes personnel replaced by their employers (e.g. mining companies), by voluntary agencies (e.g. churches)
and by new management contractors (e.g. for nationalized enterprises).
^ Present total 20,000 of whom 1075 2,000 assumed unavailable or unacceptable after independence. 22,000
promotions and new entries with, when possible, brief "upgrading" and gap filling courses.
6 Excludes government agricultural services.
7 Special case. Immediate post-independence data assure loss of present Fishing Fleet and substitution 
foreign "contract" fleet with partially Namibian crews. Sec Sectoral Notes.
B Includes government agricultural services. Excludes police, prison, armed forces.
9 Categories not comparable. Present post figure includes "Bantu Administration", "Coloured Administration",
"Security" Forces ottier than army (i.e. police, prisons).
10 E x c l ud es  arniv, p o l i t y ,  p r i s o n ' ; .
N M E :  Th.se estimates ate tonstiited ftom Sect ole t data. Table 7 and Tattle (>. They ate, therefore, subject to
c O t is i . l .  I a b l e  i l iaca  or CV Ml  .......  1 i ma t i | . . . !. -per,. I. •„ t g o v e r n m e n t  p r . „ „ a „ „ l , .  p r i o r i t i e s .  tv'. >t k i s
c o t  timing ,.t. r. In. in., tit. te.lmi.al I t ,t„ • bv m-.re detailed sett.,, data r..|te,tieti,
at. 1 1 i- .e. t . .1 i. .1 i t..
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TARLF. 9
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY PROJECTIONS TO "1985-06" 
A. Magnitude by category
2Category
High-Middle ^ 
Qualification
"1980-81"
Other Total
High-Middle _ 
Qualification
"1985-
Other
86
Total
Managers/Admin. ^ 6,000 - 6,000 7,500 _ 7,500
Professionals/
Para-profess? onals 25,000 - 25,000 32,500 - 32, 500
Clerical/Secretarial 3,500 5,000 8,500 4,000 7,000 11,COO
Supervi sory/roreman 10,500 10,000 20,500 17,500 10,000 27, 500
(Large Agri.) (6,500) (4,000) (10,500) (12,500) - (12,500)
(Other) (4,000) (6,000) (10,000) (5,000) (10,000) (15,000)
Ski1led 5,000 - 5,000 6,500 - 6, 500
Semi-skilled 5,000 70,000 75,000 10,000 87,500 97,500
(Large Agri.) ( - ) (25,000) (25,000) ( - ) (37,500) (37,500)
(Other (5,000) (45,000) (50,000) (10,000) (50,000) (60,000)
Un-ski lied - 130,000 130,000 - 155,000 155,000
(Large Agri.) ( - ) (75,000 (75,000 ( - ) (90,000) (90,000)
(Other ( - ) (55,000) (55,000) ( - ) (65,000) (65,000)
Domestic - 30,000 30,000 - 30,000 30,000
Small Scale Non-Afri
Self-employed^ - 10,000 10,000 - 20,000 20,000
Snail Agriculture * 200,000 200,000 - 175,000 175,000
Total employed 55,000 455,000 510,000 78,000 484,500 362,300
(Small Agriculture) ( - ) (200,000) (200,000) ( - ) (175.000) (175.COO)
(Large Agriculture)^ (8,500) (103,500) (112,000) (14,500) (127,500) (142,000)
(Non Agriculture) (46,500) (151,500) (198,000) (63,500) (182,000) (245,500)
Eu ropean/Expa t r i a t e s 15,000 16,000
Namibians 495,000 546,500
Namibian Labour Force 510,000 560,000
Unemployed/Security Forces** 15,000 13,500
Unemployed/Total Labour
Force 2% 2%
Unemployed/ Urban Labour
Force 5% 4%
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B. Target Urban Employment Changes
1977 - "80 - 81” Q1977 Urban employment - (excluding unemployed) 204,000
Less;
Domestic Service Decline -45,000
Other Structural changes^ -30,000
TABLE 9
Added s
High/Middle Qualification1 1  17,500
Other Government Service 17,500
12Programmes Special 25,000
Other to be identified1 3  9,000
-75,000
+69,000
*1980/81" Urban employment target 198,000
"1980 - 81" - "85 - 8 6 "
"1980 
Added s
- 81" Urban employment target1 3  198,000
High/Middle Qualification1 4 23,000
Other "Normal" Growth1 3  7,000
Construction Sector Target1 6 7,500
Self-employed - Small
17Service Units Target 7,500
Other to be identified1 3  2,500
47,500
"1985 - 8 6 " Urban employment target 245,500
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1 See Notes 1 - 3 ,  Table 3.
2 Catagorisation parallel to Table 7. Number for 1977 
adjusted as at final note to Table 7.
3 See Table 7 - Note 1. Apparent change in ratios and 
rapid expansion over period relates to necessary use 
personnel with skills below medium term acceptable level 
(and of vacancies) which by definition possess no skills) 
in "1980/81".
4 Old category included proprietors and therefore 5,000 
odd large farm owners/managers. In this table these are 
assumed to be largely gone (see Table 7) and replaced by
"Supervisor/Foreman" leaders on each unit plus supporting 
teams.
5 "1980-81" assumes use some large agricultural unit fore­
man upgraded without additional training but trained by 
"1985-86".
6 See section B this table.
7 From population projections (Table 3) and labour force 
projections (Table 5).
8 No estimate of army/police/prisons has been included. 
Therefore this residual figure includes both security 
service employees and urban unemployed. For the un­
employed % computations unemployed set at 10,000 and 8,500 
respectively, therefore assuming a proforma security force 
employment of 5,000. The exclusion is justified partly
on general security grounds but more particularly on the 
basis that the Liberation Movement has more technical 
expertise than UNIN in this field and will use some 
members of the Liberation Forces as the core for indepen­
dent Namibian Security Forces.
Notes on Table 9
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9 Table 6.
10 Loss of employment consequential on closure of busi­
nesses previously serving European community only and of 
departure of European employers in other non-cricical 
sectors. Includes 12,500 per Table 7 and 17,500 unskilled 
and semi-skilled.
11 See Table 8.
12 Special paraprofessional and small production unit for 
displaced domestic employees and women moving from rural 
areas.
13 Target to be sought.
14 From Part A this table.
15 Assumes 15% overall growth of non-agricultural employment 
growth for 5 years, i.e. slightly under 3% a year.
16 This is not in fact a major programme; if labour inten­
sive methods are used a moderate sixed dam and irrigation 
channels would require this order of work force.
17 Includes co-operative urban ventures joint owner/operators 
as self-employed.
NOTE: These projections represent possible targets to be
sought, not predictions nor the "natural course of events". 
They are subject to wide margins of error. The underlying 
population and labour force projections are too weak for 
the "unemployment" figure to be taken seriously except 
as a broad indication of approximate balance if the 
estimates are broadly right and the target basically 
achieved.
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TABLE 10
EDUCATION/TRAINING PATTERN ESTIMATES (1977) 
(for economically active population in Namibia
Level 2/ European Coloured African Total
University or equivalent 5,000 25 1 0 5,000
3Other tertiary 5,000 25 1 0 5,000
4Secondary or equivalent 1 0 , 0 0 0 3,000 2 , 0 0 0 15,000
Other post primaryJ 7, 500 3,000 2 , 0 0 0 1 2 , 0 0 0
Complete primary 9,000 24,000 19,000 52,000
Substantial primary^ Negl. 9,500 1 1 0 , 0 0 0 119,500
7Negligible or Nil Negl. 9,000 300,OOO 309,000
36,500 48,500 433,000 518,000®
1 All Namibians outside Namibia are excluded.
2 The university and other tertiary may be overestimated for present post 
holders if older ones have markedly less formal education and more 
experience and quasi-formal in-service training than new entrants.
3 Significant post-secodary education or training (including in- 
service and part-time) - say minimum 12-18 months full time 
equivalent.
4 Form 6 and Form 4 completions grouped. (Largely Form 4 as Form 6
completion normally leads into further education or training). Also
includes 30 months or longer post primary courses, e.g. teacher
and nurses training of that level and duration.
5 Incomplete secondary and post-primary courses or training pro­
grammes of less than 30 months.
6 Enough to retain ability to read, write, do simple arithmetic.
Say over four years (including sub-standards).
7 No education or partial primary education followed by relapse 
to functional illiteracy.
8 For African and Coloured persons who are not economically active 
in Namibia an approximate breakdown is:
Students 160,000
Substantial Primary 80,000
Negligible or Nil 420,000
Other 10,000
The other (i.e. complete primary or above) category is mainly Namibians 
outside Namibia including members of liberation struggle, refugees, 
overseas students. Probably 150-200 University or equivalent,
100-150 other tertiary or equivalent and 600-700 secondary or equivalent). 
NOTE; All estimates highly approximate.
TABLE 11 
"BANTU" EDUCATION/HEALTH 
A. Educat ion
1973 1974 1975
Pupil enrolment in Primary Classes
lower Primary (SSA-Std.2) 86,900 93,006 98,926
higher Primary (Std. 3 - Std. 6 ) 26,254 29,432 31,001
total 113,234 122,438 129,927
Pupil enrolment in Secondary Classes
Junior Secondary (Form I - III) 2,042 2, 427 3, 475
Senior Secondary (Form IV - V) 2 1 2 205 179
total 2,254 2,632 3,654
Student enrolment in
teacher training 463 492 576
advanced technical training - - 354
trade and vocational training 354 297 -
universities in the RSA 31 approx.37 approx.40
total 848 826 970
Total pupils and students 116,336 125,596 134,551
Total teachers 2 , 662 2,901 3,142
Total schools, training institutions 493 525 571
Number of pupils/students
per teacher 43. 7 43. 3 42. 6
Number of pupils/teachers
per school 236. 0 240. 0 235. 6
1 Data from Bantu hducat ion Journal 1975/76.
2 Not counting students enrolled at universities in the Republic of 
South Africa.
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B. Health and Demography
Life Expectancy at Birth 41
Infant Mortality (per 1,000) live births) 177
45Birth Rate
16Death Rate
Source: USAID, Development Needs and Opportunities
For Cooperation in South Africa, Washington,
1974, p.66.
TABLE 12
EDUCATION/TRAINING SECTOR: "1985 - 8 6" TARGET
A. Formal, full time institutions with enrolment directly 
related to hiah/middle qualification needs
Programme Years „ Length
Total
Jobs
For
Jobs
Annual Course Completions
For further In 
Education- Total Namibia Abroad
Total Enrollment
T 1 4 14Namibia Abroad
Teaching 
staff^
7Quarternary 1 to 5 1 , 0 0 0 n o - 1 1 0 50 60 1 0 0 140 (2 0 ) 6
IT • • *  8University 3 to 5 5,000 550 125 660 550 1 1 0 2,375 475 325
Other Tertiary 2 to 4 5,000 550 - 550 500 50 1,625 175 90
Secondary "6 "^ 
Technical 2 5,000 550 700 1 , 1 0 0 1 , 1 0 0 2,600 175
Other 2 5,000 550 700 1 , 1 0 0 1 , 1 0 0 - 2,350 - 150
Secondary "l/5"^ 5 1 0 , 0 0 0 900 2,550 3,100 3,100 - 17,500 - 850
Agricultural
Post-Primary"^ 2 to 3 8,500 765 765 765
■
2,500 150
Other Technical
Post-Primary 2 to 3 12,500 900 - 900 900 - 2,500 - 125
1 2Teacher Train. 5 1 0 , 0 0 0 600 - 600 600 - 3,500 - 150
Other Post
13primary 2 to 4 12,500 900 - 900 900 - 2,500 - 125
Total - 74 , 500 o, 375 4,075 9,785 9,565 2 2 0 37,550 790 2,250
Primary Graduate 7,650 40,000
oTABLE 12
D, Training programmes at wotkplaces, part time. short course
•
Programme Students
Teaching
Staff
m Correspondence '*’ 7
Other formal institutions
25,000 25018
Full time (In A) (In A)
c. . 19 Short course 5,000 (In A)
Part time 25,000 (In A)
Workplace - entry,
refresher, upgrading*”8 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 2 11 , 0 0 0
Total 155,000 1 , OOO
C, Basic primary and continuino educ at ion
Programme Students
Teaching
Staff
Primary school ( 6 years) 260,000 8,500 (500)'
Continuing education 260,000 500 (15,000)'
24Basic skills
25
Applied skills
(1 0 0 ,0 0 0 )
(1 0 0 ,0 0 0 )
-
Other2 6 (60,000) -
Total 9,000 (15,000)
D. Total education target
Students
Teaching
Staff
m Group A 37,500 2,250
Group B 155,000 1,250
a Group C 520,000 24,500 (9,000 ) 2
Total 712,500 28,000 (12,500)
Population age 7 and over 1,050,000
Enrol mont r.V, i o 6 8% (712,700)
Population age 13 and over 750,000
Enrolment rat .i o 60% (452,500)
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Notes to Table ]2
1 Targets beyond Secondary "6" and above cannot literally be 
met in 1985-8G because of time lags and the need to deploy 
some of present secondary school students directly to 
work on completion of secondary "1 to 5" or Secondary "6".
2 Ranges indicate different probable lengths for different 
courses, e.g. social sciences (including management) 
might be three years, natural sciences (including agri­
culture) four, engineering and medicine five in university 
programme.
3 The working assumption is that about 70,000 out of the 
78,000 high and middle level qualification posts and 
about 5,000 others (e.g. some foremen and secretarial) 
would require formal post primary programmes of one year 
of longer.
4 These output targets assume:
a) 1% of year death and retirement of citizen job holders 
at territory, 2% at secondary and post-primary levels. 
(The ratios would move toward 2?g - 3% at all levels
as age structure of senior Namibian personnel became 
more balanced);
b) 3 - 4% a year typical expansion of jobs;
c) phasing out of expatriates over 15 - 20 years with 
virtually all non-tertiary qualified and 50% of 
tertiary qualified phased out by 1990 reducing the 
expatriate personnel at that point to - say - 5,000- 
6,000;
d) some upgrading and retraining of present serving 
personnel with weak qualifications;
e) very gradual expansion (say 3% a year parallel to 
population growth) of the educational system to 
1990 - 91, with a basic reassessment of long term 
capacity requirements at that date.
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Notes to Tabic' 12 (continued)
5 Required number of students completing given programme 
in order to enter another. A - in this column does not 
mean a "dead end" but that direct continuation to another 
programme would be unusual.
6 The previous two columns do not equal the total column.
The "for further education" column includes an allowance 
for students failing to complete the next programme. 
However, such students would become available for posts 
relating to the completed programme so literal addition 
of the columns would double count.
7 Post first (university) degree programmes.
8 The distinction between University and other Tertiary
is somewhat doubtful. It does not characterize the USA, 
Japan, China or the USSR to same degree as UK, Continental 
Europe and - as a result - Africa. The basic division 
here is that a programme totally concentrated on a fairly 
specific set of directly applicable skills, e.g. some 
of institutes cited in Sectoral Notes to Chapter IV, 
is termed "Other Tertiary". It does not logically follow 
that these programmes would necessarily be in different 
institutions from university programmes.
9 Division between first five forms and sixth form here on 
British/Anglophonic West African basis. This is an 
analytical division not necessarily an institutional one.
10 For para-professionals including field level extension 
staff), supervisors.
11 Some para-technical, skilled, semi-skilled posts.
12 For primary school and training programme teachers. Other 
posts in secondary and tertiary programmes.
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Notes to Table 12 (continued)
13 For exanple, nursing, health education and other para­
medical posts, also some chemical/secretarial jobs.
14 The assumed failure to complete programme rate is 15% 
except for secondary "1/5" and secondary "6" technical 
for which it is 20%.
15 Includes research personnel. The basis for this is 
that research and teaching will be combined in cash 
tertiary academic staff member's responsibilities. The 
figures given do not include educational administrators 
nor "hotel management" (i.e. dormitory, catering service, 
transport, estates) administrators. The ratios of 
students to teachers are possible but at secondary and 
tertiary level require care in avoiding duplicative 
programmes leading to very small classes. In secondary 
and tertiary schools part time tutorial and teaching 
assistant work should be a normal part of the curriculum 
for final year students.
16 Equivalent time. These are included in University/Other 
Tertiary Staff.
17 A correspondence unit (whether separate or part of a 
broader Continuing Education Institute) is envisaged.
18 Full time core staff only. Assumes the part time use 
of staff of other institutions.
19 Annual total enrolment. Perhaps 500 at any one time. 
Particular emphasis on needs of post holders with in­
adequate previous skill acquisition opportunities, e.g. 
senior Liberation Movement personnel who are necessarily 
engaged in armed struggle until independence.
20 Includes only organized programmes of three weeks (full 
time equivalent) and above. Annual enrolment given; 
perhaps 12,500 would be in courses at any one time.
Notes to Table 12 (con t inucd)
21 Includes full time training/personnel development staff 
proportion of time to training.
22 Bracketed figure is for trainee teachers (from post­
primary programme, spending half time in practice teaching 
during fourth and fifth years.
23 Bracketed figure is total part time personnel including 
teachers and other holders of appropriate skills.
24 For example, basic reading, writing, arithmetic, English.
25 For example, agriculture, simple bookkeeping, basic 
construction skills. Includes Farm Training Institutes.
26 For example, political education, drama, dancing.
27 Bracketed figures are for full time teachers.
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GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT ESTIMATES 1920 - 1979
(ROOO,OOO current prices)
Year Sources ^ GDP Primary
Sector
Agri- 
culture/ 
Fishing
Mining
Secondary
Sector
Manufact-*
uring
Cons tr- 
uction
Public p 
Utilities
Tertiary
Sector
Transport, 
communi- 
cat ions
Trade,
Housing
Financial
Services
Other
Services
General
Government
2 0 2 0 A 13.0 9.2 1.7 7.6 0.4 0.3 0 . 1 3.2 (O.O) 3 (0 .8 ) _ 0 . 8 0 . 8
1 1 • 1 3 A 1 0 . 6 6.4 1.3 5. 1 0 . 6 0.5 0 . 1 - 3.6 (0 .8 ) (0 .8 ) - 1 . 2 0 . 8Jv, ' O A 13.0 7.2 1.9 5.3 1 . 0 0 . 6 0. 3 - 5.0 (1 .1 ) (1 .1 ) - l .e 1 . 0
1 - 1 0 A 9.8 4.8 0. 5 4.3 , 0 . 8 0 . 6 0 . 2 - 4.2 (0 .0 ) (0 .8 ) - 1.5 1 . 1
1 ° 3 3 A 3.8 0 . 6 0.7 (Neg)* 0 . 6 0.5 0 . 1 - 2 . 6 (0.4) (0.4) - 1 . 2 0 . 6
l ‘> : 5 A 8.4 4.8 3.9 1 . 0 0 . 6 0.4 0 . 1 - 2 . 8 (0.5) (0.5) - 1 . 1 0.7
2 0.4 o A 10.4 5.4 5. 1 0.4 0 . 6 0.5 0 . 1 - 4.4 (0 .0 ) (0.9) - 1.7 1 . 0
1 0 4 A 19.8 1 1 . 6 9.0 2 . 6 1 . 2 0 . 8 0. 5 - 6 . 8 (1 .6 ) (1.7) - 2 . 1 1.5
] 0.4 A 3 2 2 . 2 (1 2 .2 ) 6 . 4 5.8 (l.o) 1 . 6 5 6 (ft. 4) 1 . 6 2.4 - 2.3 2 . 1
i '•: o B 61.0 (40.9) 2 0 . 8 2 0 . 1 (3.4) 3.4 5 6 (16.7) 3.7 4.6 - 4.4 4.0
lv»f4 B 107.2 (6 8 .0 ) 2 2 . 2 35.8 (7.5) 7. 5 5 6 (31.7) 5.4 1 0 . 0 - 8.7 7.6
1 o * 6 3 141 . 6 (43.5) 33.5 60.0 (C.7) 8.7 5 6 (39.-1) 6.7 1 2 . 6 - 1 0 . 8 9.3
10-5 B 121.3 (6 6 .2 ; 23. 3 42.9 (14.1 ) 14.1 5 6 (41.0) 6 . 1 1 1 . 0 - 3 2.4 11. 5
lfjr' Oa B 1 2 2 . 0 (62.6) 13.2 49.4 (14.9) 14.9 5 6 (44.5) 8 . 5 8 . 5 - 13.8 13.7
i - • D 141 .u 69.0 2 1 . 1 47.9 18.4 12.7 4 1.4 54.2 1 2 . 2 13.8 11.5 6 . 1 8 . 8
1 - fO B 146.7 (82.5) 35.2 47. 3 (14.2) 14.2 5 6 (50.0) 10.7 9.7 - 14. 5 15.1i»>,. C 2 1  J. 9 142. 5 42. 8 99.7 (17.0) - - - (54.4) - - - - -
lo~0 a D 370.4 175.8 60.7 115.1 54. 5 35.8 14.8 3.9 149. 1 26.7 45.5 30.9 15.9 30.1
i *"vb £ 373. 1 _ - - - - - - - - - - - -
1 o - r D- 4 55. 5 _ _ - - - - - - - - - - -
io- 3 E * 615.6 402.0 123.0 369.0 (30.9) - - - (92.7) - - - - -
1°~4 D . 592 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
io- 6 ~P 741 _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - -
I O - 7 G 1 2 35 575 210 j 365 160 85 60 15 400 60 135 85 50 701070 H 1700 1035 195 655 150 80 52.5 17.5 425 63 140 90 55 75
TTS: 1 The procedures, covor.iqe, categories of the different sources vary. Neither totals nor sectoral components are fully comparable.
2  Water, electricity.
3 Bracketed ( ) Figures are interpolated, not direct from source.
4 Negative value added.
5 Included in manufacturing.
6 Included in other services.
7 Includes forestry.
A. D.C. Krogh: "The National Income and Expenditure of South West Africa (1920 - 1950), South African Journal of Economics, Vol. 28.
B. Odendaal Report, Table CVIII.
C. R. Murray "The Namibian Economy" in R. Murray et al, The Role of For^inn Firms in Namibia.
D. W. H. Thomas, "The Economy of South West Africa: An Overall Perspective", mimco.
E. United Nations, Report of Special Committee on Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peonies, A/10023, September 1975.
F. RSA Official Estimate Reported to "SV.'A Legislative Assembly" by D. Mudge. 1975 Official Estimate R 644 million. Alternative 
1975 figures Thomas R755 million and W.S. Barthold R826.4 million (Namibia's Economic Potential, 1977) estimated from fragmentary 
RS^ and unofficial data.
G. Table 15.
H. Table 17.
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TABLE 14 
GDP/GNP GAP ESTIMATES
Year GDP GNP GNP % of GDP
1946 22.2 20.4 92
1950 61.0 46.4 76
1954 107.2 74.4 70
1956 141.6 85.1 60
1958 121.3 83.2 69
1962 146.7 104.1 71
1969 368.9 278.0 75
1977 1135.0 710.0 63
SOURCEi Odendaal Report Pretoria, 1964.
Financial Mail ''Desert Deadlock" , 2. 3.1973 
Table 15.
TABLE 15 
]97? TERRITORTAL ACCOUNTS 
- A -
Namibian Gross Domestic Product - 1977
(R 000,000)
Sector Value added %
Agriculture 157% (177%)3 13.9 (15.2)3
Peasant Household Use 1 2 0 ( 40 )3 1 .9 ( 3. 4 ) 3
2Commercial 137% 1 2 . 1
Forestry 2 O. 2
Fishing 40% ( 41 ) 3.5
Household Use % ( 1 ) 0 . 1 ( o . i )3
Commercial 40 3.4
Mining1 375 33.2
Primary Sector 575 (595%) 50.7 (51.0)3
Manufacturing 85 7.5
Food Processing 50 4.4
Other Large Scale 25 2 . 2
Small Scale"* 
6Construction
1 0
60
( 1 2 %) 0.9
5.3
( i . o )3
Electricity/Water 15 1.3
Secondary Sector 160 (162%) 14.1 (14.0)3
Transport/Communication/Storage 60 5.3
Trade
7Accomodation
1 1 0
25 ( 32%)
9.7
2 . 2 ( 2 . 8 ) 3
Financial Services 85 7.5
Social and Personal Services 50 4.4
Domestic Service 15 1.3
Other 35 3.1
QGeneral Government 70 6 . 2
Tertiary Sector 400 (407%) 35.2 (35.0) 3
Gross Domestic Product 1135 (1165 ) 1 0 0 . 0 (1 0 0 .0 )3
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Notes to Table 15 - A -
1 Food produced and consumed in the same household unit. 
Estimated at R100 time? 200,000 households with some food pro­
duction. Implies physical output per "subsistence sector" 
household about one half Tanzanian level.
2 Estimated make up of sales in R 000,000
Beef 70 - 75
Milk/Butter 7?g
Small Stock/eggs/hides 12^
Karakul pelts 50 - 55
Wool 2^
Cereals 5 - 7%
Other crops 5 - 7%
Total 152^-167%
Less Inputs purchased 20 - 25
Value Added 132^-142%
3 All bracketed Figures reestimate household consumed output at 
urban price equivalent (household import parity) instead of
farm gate prices (household export parity) or nominal cost of materials.
4 Computed as slightly over 80% of export value. Earlier years data 
shows up to 89% ratios. Downward adjustment is for fuel cost 
increase and higher import content in uranium.
5 Includes £2.5 million (R 5.0 million per note 3) African house­
hold produced/consumed handicraft and related value added.
6 Approximately 2/3 government construction equivalent to 
33 l/3% of capital budget.
7 17,500 European houses rental average R1,000; hotels and 
lodging houses R5 million. African rural houses R2^ million 
on material cost or R10 million on rental value basis.
8 Excludes public enterprises and value added in government con­
struction. Basically Recurrent Budget wages and salaries 
(R55-65 million).
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TABLE 15 
- B -
Distribution of G r o s s  Domestic Product (R 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 )  
Household Own Use Production
Wages and Salaries 25 2 . 2
European1 2 1 0 (18.5%)
African/"Coloured" 105 ( 9.3%) 315 27.8%
3Taxes on Proprietors 175 15.4%
4Surpluses of Production Units 15 ( 1.3%) 620 54.6%
Small European6 105 ( 9.3%)
Large European6 500 (44.1%)
1135 1 0 0 .0%
1 Estimated at 30,000 times R7,000 average. Includes pensions, 
social security, fringe benefits.
2 Estimated at R200 per employee in Domestic Service; R250 large 
Agriculture; R400 Construction; R500 Fishing and other; R600 
Government, Transport and Communication, Commerce, Finance;
R1,000 Mining, Manufacturing, Water and Electricity. Includes 
payments in kind and provident Funds.
3 Minerals taxes, company tax, income tax on business undertakings 
but not income tax on wages/salaries or consumption taxes.
4 Net of taxes is listed at Note 3. Gross of depreciation.
5 Cash sales related surpluses e.g. livestock, milk, petty 
commerce.
6 Estimated 10,500 business at average surplus of £10,000.
Includes individual proprietors, normal partnerships, 
companies with surplus of £50,000 or less.
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TABLE 15
- C -
Distribution of Personal Income ( R 000,000)
Personal Income1 Total (R 000,000) Per Capita (Rand)
African/"Coloured"
"Subsistence" 25 22
Wages (including "in kind") 105 91
Other 15 145 13__ 125
European
Wages/Salaries 210 1983
Production Unit Surpluses
(excluding corporate profits) 105 315 992_297 5
1 Derived from Tables 1 and 13 - B
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TABLE 15
D
Gross National Product (Remittance Basis) (R 000,000)
GDP 1,135
Remittances
European Wages/Salaries (25%) 52.5
Small Enterprise Surplus (25%) 32.5
Large Enterprise 300.0
State-Recurrent Account
3State Enterprises
2 60.0
- 2 0 .0 425
Gross National Product 710
1 Strictly foreign owned surpluses retained in a territory con­
stitute a deduction from GDP (and a net inflow of foreign 
investment). Practically most computations work from 
estimates of remitted foreign earnings.
2 The "state" in question is South Africa and thus not a Namibian 
body. On recurrent account there is a surplus of about R60 
million. This is not properly offset by government capital 
expenditure which in the case of Namibia constitutes "foreign 
investment". 1976/77 Budget Year surplus on this basis was
of the order of £46 million. 1977/78 presumptively will be 
higher given enhanced diamond tax revenue.
3 Operating losses of Posts, Telecommunications, Railways.
Notes: As with exports, South Africa has gone to considerable
effort to prevent estimation of GDP. These estimates 
are made from incomplete data of varying dates and 
degrees of consistency and reliability. The estimates 
should be treated as approximations. South African 
military expenditure in Namibia (except a portion of 
road and communication spending) excluded. Walvis 
Bay included.
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POSSIBLE RECONCILIATION 1976 - 77 GDP ESTIMATES
- A - 
SWA Estimate
1. 1976 RSA Estimate for "SWA" R 741 million.
2. 1976 - 77 Growth.
General (1%) 7%
Uranium'*'
3. 1976 - 77 Price Increase (12% ) 2 90
4. Probable 1977 RSA Estimate R905 million
TABLE 16
6 . Probable Differences Due to Transfer
4Prices of Exports 
Agricultural Products 
Fish Products 
Minerals
7. Total After Adjustments
5. Differences in Coverage RSA Estimate 
and Table 15.
'Subsistence1 Agrigulture 17%
Commercial Agriculture 17%-15
Housing/Other Small Scale Activity
3SWA Account and Parastatal Spending
8 . Table 15 1977 Estimate
2 0-
50-
25
55
R115 million
13
1 0
2 2
R45 million
RI,065 million
RI,135 million
9. Unexplained Divergence 
RSA/Table 15 Estimates R70 million
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TABLE 16 
- B -
Barthold Estimate
1 . 1976 Estimates 826.4
2 . Output Increase 6 8 . 6
3. Price Increase 107.5
4. Pro Forma 1977 1,002.5 million
5. Coverage Adjustments5 50
6 . Transfer Pricing Adjustments 45
7. Comparable Total 1,097.5 million
8 . Unexplained Divergence
Barthold/Table 15 Estimates 37.5 million
; to Table 16 - A - and - B -
1 Rossing output 1976 under 750 tonnes, 1977 in 2,500 -
3,000 tonne range.
2 1976 price deflator increase over 1975 was 14%.
3 Wages, salaries and value added in construction related 
to "SWA" Account and some Parastatal Account spending are 
apparently treated as RSA, not "SWA" value.
4 Artificial export prices by RSA or overseas companies 
shifting value added from "SWA" to RSA, UK or USA. 
Estimated pro forma at 10% for agricultural exports, 15% 
for fish products.
5 Barthold's estimate is adjusted upward by about R85 
million on the official estimate cited. The exact items 
covered are unclear but are not identical to those 
listed in "A".
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TERRITORIAL ACCOUNTS PROJECTIONS
TABLE 17
- A -
Namibian Gross Domestic Product 
Projections : 1979 - "1985-86" 
(R 000,000)!
2Sector 1979 "1985-86"
Value Added % Value Added %
Agriculture 162 ^ 1 1 1403 8
Forestry 2\ — -
Fishing 30 2 42^4 2\
Mining 655 47 850 5 50
Primary Sector 850 60 1035 61
Manufacturing 80 6
1 0 5 6 6Food Processing (40) (45) *
Other (40) (60) 1Construction 52 % 4 90 8 5
Electricity/Water 17^ 5 1 2 0 1
Secondary Sector 150 1 1 215 13
Transport/Communication/
Storage 65 4 75 4)5
Trade 1 1 0 8 90 9 5
Accommodation 30 2 25 1
Financial Services 90 6 75 9 4)5
Social and Personal Services 55 4 35 9 2
General Government 75 5 150 1 0 9
Tertiary Sector 425 29 450 27
Gross Domestic Product 1425 1 0 0 1700 1 0 0
1. 1978 Prices
2. See Notes Table 16.
3. Livestock - 50, Dairying + 10, Crops + 17*5
4. Recovery to 1976-77 levels.
5. Increase in uranium oxide, reactivation base metal capacity
closed in 1979.
6 . Additional meat packing, milling.
7. Including a cement plant but largely small scale.
8 . Includes small scale housing, water, urban works. Assumes
at least one major rail or irrigation project.
9. Sectors sharply affected by decline in resident European 
population.
10. General expansion services plus (pro forma) security force 
salaries.
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TABLE 17 
- B -
Distribution of Gross Domestic Product (R 000,000)
1979 % "1985 - 8 6" %
Household Production For Own Use 25 2 50 3
Wages and Salaries 390 28 750 44
African/"Coloured" (130) (9) (500) (29)
European (260) (18) (250) (14)
Surpluses of Production Units 810 56 500 29
African - Private 
African - State 
Small European 
Large European
(2 0)
(NA)
(90)
(700)
(1 )
(-)
(6 )
(49)
(40)
(225)
(25)
(2 1 0 )
(2 )
(13)
(1 )
(1 2 )
Taxes on Proprietors 2 0 0 14 400 24
1425 1 0 0 1700 1 0 0
1. See Notes Table 16- B.
- C -
19 79 "1985-86"
Personal Income1 (R 000,000 Total Total
Per Capita 
(Rand)
African/"Coloured" 195 590 407
Household Production
Wages
Other
25
130
2 0
50
500
40
34
345
28
European 350 275 5500
Wages/Salaries 
Production Unit 
Surpluses (excluding 
corporate profits)
260
90
250
25
5000
500
1. Derived From Tables 6 , 7, Id - B.
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Table 1 7 (concluded)
- D -
Gross National Product (Remittance Basis)^ (R 000,000)
1979 "1985-86'
GDP 1425 (100%) 1700
Remittances^
European Wages/Salaries 
Small Enterprise Surplus 
Large Enterprise 
State - Recurrent Account 
State Enterprises
Gross National Product
-475 (33%) -125
(-57%) (-50)
(-22%) (-10)
(t 320) (-65)
(-100) (Negl.)
(+25) ( - )
950 (67%) 1575
(100%)
(7%)
(93%)
1. See Notes Table 16 - D.
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NAMIBIAN VISIBLE EXPORTS 
1966 - 1977 (R 000,000) 
(Current Prices)
TABLE 18
1966 % 1970 % 1973 % 1977 %
Agricultural Products 32.6 15.6 49 20.9 93 26.6 130 20/18
Karakul Pelts 15.9 7.6 25 10.7 50 13.6 60-65 1 0
Wool ( ) ( ) ( ) 2-3 0.3
Meat & Products (16.6) 7.9 (24) 1 0 . 2 (48) 13.0 60-65 1 0
Other ( ) ( ) ( ) 2-3 0.3
Fishery Products 48.9 23.4 56 23.8 804 21.7 65 10/9
Fish Meal 22.4 10.7 28 11.9 40 1 0 . 8 30-35 5
Tinned Fish 14.0 6.7 16 6 . 8 25 6.5 20-25 3
Other1 12.5 6 . 0 1 2 5.1 15 4.4 10-15 2
Mineral Products 127.8 61.1 130 56.3 1904 51.7 465-515 70/74
Diamonds 85.0 40.6 70 29.8 lOO3 27. 8 250-3005 36/40
Uranium - - - - - - 80-1056 14
Copper 19.2 9.2 25 1 0 . 6 40 10.9 50-60 9
Lead 12.3 5.9 18 7.7 28 7.5 37^-47^ 6
2Zinc and Other 11.3 5.4 17 7.2 2 2 5.6 25-30 4
Total Visible Esports 209.3 1 0 0 . 0 234 1 0 0 . 0 4368 1 0 0 . 0 660-710 1 0 0
Exports as % of GDP 67% 62% 62?g 58/62% 7
Notes;
1 Fish, Oil, Lobster, Seal Products, Frozen Fish.
2 Tin, Vanadium, Cadmium, Lithium, Manganese, Silver.
3 Alternative estimates R127m to R147m appears likely to be more nearly 
accurate.
4 Alternate estimate by Barthold, R380m-£230m minerals, 60m fish and 
products, 90m agricultural products.
5 Estimated from 1976-77 volume and price increases and ternatively 
from calendar 1977 tax estimates and normal ratio of tax to exports.
6 Assumes 2,000-2,250 tonnes concentrate exports of 3,000 produced.'
7 Coverage of 1977 GDP estimate is broader than earlier ones. On the 
1973 GDP comparable basis the ratio would be 65-69%.
Notes to T£\blo 18 (continued)
Sources:
Note:
1966 - South West Africa Survey 1967
1970 - 1973/74 - W. H. Thomas, "The Economy of 
South West Africa", mimeo.
1977 - Various sources.
1. All post 1966 estimates are based on calcul­
ations from fragmentary data of different 
dates, coverage and accuracy. The Republic
of South Africa has gone to considerable effort 
to make it impossible to compile Namibian 
external trade data. All estimates are, 
therefore, at best approximate.
2. All estimates include products of and exports 
through Walvis Bay.
3. All estimates include trade to and through the
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TABLE 19 
NAMIBIAN EXPORT PROJECTIONS
1979 - "1985-86" (R 000,000) 1
Agricultural Products
1979
130
%
13
"1985-86"
702
Jk_
6
Karakul Pelts 65 6.5 40 3
Wool 2 h 2*5 _
Meat and Products 60 6 25 2
Other 2 h - 2 k -
Fishery Products2 30 3 402 3
Fish 1 0 1 1 2 % 1Tinned Fish 1 0 1 17% 1.5
Other 1 0 1 1 0 1
Mineral Products 850 85 1140 91
Diamonds4 475 47 475 ' 38
Uranium3 275 27 550 44
Copper6 30 3 50 4
Lead6 40 4 32% 3
Zinc and Other6 30 3 32% 3
Total Visible Exports 1 0 1 0 1250
Exports as % of GDP 71% 74%
1. In 1978 Prices.
2. Assumes significant transitional damage to sector not fully 
made good by "1985-86".
3. Sector badly damaged by overfishing.
4. Assumes static output post 1977.
5. Assumes 4,000+ tonnes 1979; 8,000 tonnes 1985-86.
6 . Some capacity closed in 1979; assumed to be reactivated by
"1985-86".
-
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BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ESTIMATES1 
(ROO.OOO)
TABLE 20
Visible Trade 1977 1979 'T.985-86"'12
Visible Exports 
Visible Imports
700
450
1 0 0 0
700
1250
1150
+250 +300 + 1 0 0
2Invisible Trade
Services Exports 
Services Imports
15
65
15
90
5
125
Services Balance -50 -75 - 1 0 0
Remittances (- means outflow)
- 5013
~ 1014- 65
Negl. 
N. A.
a. Individuals from Income
b. Small Proprietors from Income
c. Large Firms from Income 3
d. Government Recurrent Account
e. Railways, Telecoms. Recurrent
Account
-52.5
-32.5
-300
-60
+20
-S7f
- 2 2  J
-320
- 1 0 0
+25
Remittances Balance -425 -475 -125
4Lono Term Capital (- means outflow)
a. Individuals
b. Small Term Proprietors
c. Large Firms5 6
d. Government Capital Account
e. Parastatals Capital Account
f. Reduction Financial Institution 
Claims on South Africa
-50
-50
+60
+115
+ 30 
+ 1 0 0
-75
-75
+50
+125
+ 30 
+150
-5
-5
Negl. 
+5015 
+ 1 1 0
N. A.
Long Term Capital Balance +205 +205 +150
0Short Term Capital + ? + 7 + 25
9Central Bank 7 7 - 5016
Errors and Omissions + 20 + 45 7
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Notes to Table 20
1 See Tables 15, 17, 18, 19. Estimates are all approximate. No 
official data are made public. Since there is no RSA/Namibia 
exchange control barrier invisible, remittance, banking system and 
commercial credit data probably do not exist in any systematic 
form.
2 Excludes interest, dividends - these are included in remittances.
3 Recurrent revenue from exceeds recurrent expenditure in Namibia.
4 Items a and b represent capital flight. Very crude estimates. 
These appear to have been financed largely by running down 
deposits with financial institutions (or increasing borrowing 
from them). As these institutions have held net investment/ 
deposit balances in the Republic as part of the counterpart to 
Namibian deposit^ f (reducing claims on South Africa) should 
offset a, b. Errors in f and a, b guesstimates should, therefore, 
be largely cross-cancelling.
5 Basically mineral prospecting plus Langer Heinrich development.
6 Derived from 76-77 Estimates.
7 Derived from 76-77 Estimates. Railways and Harbours, Post and 
Telecommunications (R18 million) and rough guess as to other 
parastatal (e.g. electricity, water) capital spending not 
financed through government budget or from territorial operating 
surplus.
8 Probably a net inflow because of decline of outstanding fish 
processing unit end of year claims fi'om 1976 because of low 1977 
catch. No data available.
9 Pro forina. Given that there is neither a territorial central bank 
nor a separate currency this item would be the net change of 
currency (South African) in circulation in Namibia. Some 
remittances and capital flight have taken the form of notes thus 
reducing circulation in Namibia. However, inflation has presump­
tively had the opposite effect so the net movement of currency 
circulation is unclear. No data exist and no official estimates 
are available.
1 0 2
Notes to Table 20 (continued)
10 Balancing item.
11 1979 and "1985-86" in 1978 prices.
12 High speculative.
13 Assumes exchange control but relatively liberal remittances 
for resident expatriates.
14 Assumes dividend control but allowance some dividends abroad.
15 Includes grant technical assistance.
16 i.e. R50 million addition to Central Bank external reserves. 
(Assumed target level R250-350 million. Initial level by 
conversion of rand, R50 million; additions year 1-4 of 
independence R100-150 million.)
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TABLE 21 
LAND USE PATTERNS 1976 
( 0 0 0 hectares)^
Total
European
Ranches
African
Areas
Total Area 82,400 37,700 32,600
Arable 700 1 0 0 600
2Of which irrigated (.07) (.07) (-)
Permanent Pastures 52,900 36,800 16,100
3Forest, Woodland 10,400 400 6 , 0 0 0
4Waste and Other 18,300 370 9,850
Permanent Water" 1 0 0 30 50
Notesi
1 All estimates except total area highly approximate.
2 Approximately 1,500 ha. Hardap Scheme and 5,500 spot irrigation.
3 Includes a proportion of very sparse savannah woodland.
4 Desert, bare rock, swanp and urban.
5 Small lakes.
Sources:
FAO, Production Yearbook. 1977.
Namibia, Food and Anriculture Sector, 1975.
Southern African Development Coordination Conference, Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries. 1979.
A.M. Mramba, Possibilities for the Future Development of Livestock 
Ranching In an Independent Namibia. 1977.
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COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE ESTIMATED SECTORAL ACCOUNTS 1977 - 78
(R 000)
European Cash Sales 162.5
European Production Used to Pay Labour 1.5
TABLE 22
African Cash Sales 1 0 . 0
174.0
Beef 85.0 European Wages 4.0
Dairy 7.5 African Wages 15.0
Smallstock,Eggs, Hides 12.5 Cash (7.5)
Karakul 55.0 Kind (715)
Wool 2.5 Implements 2 0 . 0
Cereals 5 Operating Inputs 25.0
Other 6.5 Gross Fixed Investment 15.0
Financial Charges 10.0
Net Operating Surplus 85.0
174.0
Notes: A tentative estimation from scattered data of different dates.
Sources: Estimated from data in:
C. Nixon, "Land Use and Development in Namibia", 1978.
A.M. Mramba, Possibilities For the Future Development of 
Livestock Ranchino In An Independent Namibia, 1977.
G. Max, "Wage Survey", 1976.
Windhoek Observer, various issues 1978-79.
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TABLE 23 
LIVESTOCK PATTERNS 1913-1976
(ooo)
Animal Year Total European
owned
African
owned
Cattle 19131 206 183 23
1958 3,222 2,078 1, 150
1960 2,440 1,832 608
1965 2,347 1,543 805
1970 2,5002 2,130 2370
1971 2,810 1,940 870
1976 2,875 2 , 0 0 0 875
Sheep 1960 3,1313 2,654 5477“
1965 3, 839 3,641 199
1970 4,000 3,750 250
1971 4,100 3,825 275
1976 5,0854 4,7504 335
Goats 1960 1,359 525 834
1965 1,541 625 916
1970 1,700 650 1,050
1971 1,750 675 1,075
1976 2,026 800 1,226
Sheep & Goats 1913^ 1,034 738 316
Pigs 1965 2 0 2 0 -
1970 24 24 -
1971 26 26 -
1976 30 30 -
Poultry 1965 339 - -
1970 400 - -
1971 410 - -
1976 500 - -
Horses, Asses C.Mules 1976 Ill5 - -
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Notes to Table 23
1 Police Zone only - excludes Kaokoveld, Ovambo, Okavango, 
Caprivi.
2 Underestimate. More likely total 3,000 and African 870.
3 Rehoboth figure of 344 (versus 49 in 1965) incredible. 
Probably correct figure was 34 in which case African 167, 
Total 2,821.
4 Probably overestimated. 4,335 total and 4,000 European 
appears more likely.
5 Excludes Turnhalle members.
Sources: Compiled from
FAO, Namibia Prospects for Future Development. 1977.
Production Yearbook. 1977.
Republic of South Africa, Bureau of Statistics, Report No. 3 
South West African Survey, 1967.
A.F. Calvert, South West Africa Under The German Occupation. 
T.W. Laurie, London, 1916.
A.M. Mramba, Possibilities For The Future Development Of 
Livestock Ranching In An Independent Namibia.
1964.
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EUROPEAN CATTLE HERDS, OFFTAKE 
(OOO)
Number of Head of Offtake (Culling-rate)
Year Cattle kept by ----- ------------------------
White Namibians Total ' on the hoof exports
to the RSA
TABLE 24
1968 1,500 317 259
1969 1,980 312 241
1970 2,130 417 306
1971 1,940 502 353
1972 1,950 583 435
1973 1, 500 507 n . a.
1974 1,880 276 n. a.
1975 n . a. n . a. n . a.
1976 n . a. n . a. 2328
1977 2,000 400 320
Notes:
1 In recent years, some 33,000 head of cattle have 
been slaughtered annually in Namibia to supply 
the Namibian public with fresh meat.
2 Estimate
Sources: South African Financial Gazette, Supplement 
on South West Africa, August 30, 1974, p.9. 
ECA, Summaries of Economic Data. Namibia 
1973, 6th Year, No.2.
South West Africa Survey 1974, Department 
of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1975, p.34.
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TABLE 25 
KARAKUL PELT EXPORTS 1960-1976
Export of South 
African and Namibian 
Karakul Pelts!
Average Price 
per . 
Karakul Pelt
Number of Namibian 
Karakul Pelts 
Exported
Value of Najnibian 
Karakul Pelts 
Exports
Year Number Rand Number million Rand
1960 2,747,659 4.38 1,648,595 7.2
1970 5,148,396 5.78 3,089,037 17.9
1971 5,388,182 8.09 3,232,909 26.2
1972 5,514,011 9.96 3,308,406 33.0
1973 5,009,443 9.21 3,005,665 27.7
1974 4,692,500 9.33 2,815,500 26.3
1975 ’4,841,995 11.90 2,905,197 34.6
1976 4,809,802 17.823 2,885,881 51.4
Notes:
1 Source provides this column.
2 Calculated on the basis of column 2 on estimate that 2/5 of total 
production originates in the Republic of South Africa and 3/5 
originates in Namibia.
3 The price rise is partly due to the devaluation of the Rand by 15%.
Sources: Karakul Board, Annual Report for the Finance Year Ended
30 June 1974, Windhoek; Information by Mr. Manning of the 
Karakul Board, January 31, 1977, Windhoek.
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CROP PRODUCTION ESTIMATES 1971-1976 
(hectares, tonnes)
TABLE 26
Crop 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Wheat
Area
Production 
Maize 
Area2 
Production 
Millet 
Area2 
Production 
Surqhum 
Area2 
Production 
Total Grain 
Area
Production 
Roots and Tubers 
Area
Production
Pulses
Area
Production 
Fresh Vegetables
3Production
Total
4Area
Production
600
600
600
600
700
700
700
700
700
700
30.000 32,000 32,000 32,000 32,000
10.000 12,000 12,000  12,000  12,000
48.000 49,000 50,000 51,000 52,000
17.000 17,500 18,000 18,500 19,000
6.000  7,000  7,000  7,000  7,000
2 . 0 0 0  2,300 2,300 2,300 2,300
84.600 88,600 89,700 90,700 91,700
29.600 32,400 33,000 33,500 34,000
12,500 12,500 13,000 13,500 14,500
105,000 105,000 110,000 115,000 120,000
3,300 3,300 3,300 3,400 3,400
5,900 6,000 6,200 6,300 6,400
700
700
32.000
14.000
53.000 
19,500
9,500
2,300
93s 200
36.500
14.500 
125,000
3,400
6,600
16,500 17,000 17,500 18,000 18,500 19,000
104,500 108,600 109,400 112,100 114,200 115,900
157,000 160,400 166,700 172,800 178,900 187,100
110TABLE 26 (continued)
Notes:
All data are highly approximate trend estimates. They 
do not take account of weather and, therefore, actual annual 
output fluctuations.
Probably grossly underestimated. Outputs may be closer to 
correct as yields, per hectare appear to be grossly over­
estimated.
Production and implicit acreage probably seriously underestimated.
Apparent gross underestimate. 1960 South African Agricultural 
Census Data (Report No. 1 of 1963) show about 640,000 hectares 
under cultivation - 66,000 European and 574,000 African.
Sources: Date from FA0, Namibia: Prospects For Future
Development, 1977.
TABLE 27 
COASTAL FISHERY CATCH 1966-77 
(OOO tonne)
Catch of South African Fishing Boats Catch Quotas Fish Products Manufactured 
in Namibia
Year Pilchard Anchovey Others1 Total Pilchard Tot-al Fish-meal Fish 
body oil
Canned 
Pilchard
1966 • • • • 730.0 • • •
19672 915.1 10.7 0.1 925.9 • 172.5 38. 5 83.7
19682 1,331.1 142.1 0.2 1,473.4 • 238.4 68.3 80. 3
1969 2 1,109.1 179.8 2.4 1,291.3 • 202.7 45.2 79.1
1970 5*09.7 197.1 0. 8 707.6 • 156. 3 43.9 90.1
1971 309.8 266.7 83.3 659.8 498.7 1,038.7 135. 4 27.2 57.1
1972 363.7 144.6 16.6 524.9 • 112.3 28.1 110. 5
1973 396.0 301.7 9.2 706.9 • • 143.1 46.8 135.0
1974 554.7 252.8 26.1 833.6 568. 3 940. 5 161.2 28. 3 186.6
1975 545.4 194.4 19.4 795. 2 568.3 940. 5 146.6 28.3 194.0
1976 447.3 94.1 31.1 572.5 475.3 940. 5 106.1 19.1 172.8
1977 • • • ■ 250.0 940. 5 • • •
Notes!
1 Red-eye, mackerel, maasbanker.
2 From 1967-1969, two South African fish-meal factory ships caught and processed consider­
able quantities of pilchard off the Namibian coast.
Sources: Soul h African Fishing Industry Handbook and Buyer's Guide. 13th Edition 1976/77,
Capetown (undated), p.43.
The South African Shipping News and Fi.shino Industry Review. September, 1976, p.42. 
Africa Research Bulletin. Vol. 14, No. 2., 31st March, 1977, p.4208C.
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TABLE 28 
OFFSHORE CATCH ESTIMATES 1975
(OOO tonne)^
Country t %
USSR 209,320 42.6
Spain 169,885 34.6
Poland 37,122 7.6
Cuba 28,652 5.8
Republic of South Africa 19,715 4.0
Bulgaria 8,750 1.8
Italy 6,780 1.4
Israel 6,000 1.2
Japan 5,103 1.0
Total 419,3273 100.0
Notes:
1 Groundfish including hake, redfish, bass 
and congers.
2 Between latitude 150° south and latitude 
30° south, i.e. within an area somewhat 
longer than the Namibian coastline.
3 Incomplete.
Source: International Commission for the
South E-'st Atlantic Fisheries 
(ICSEAF).
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TABLE 29
MINES, MINERALS, MINING COMPANIES
Mining Company And Mint?
1. Diamonds
CDM of SWA Limited 
Oranjemund, Diamond Area No.
Marine Diamond Corporation 
(Pty) Ltd., Foreshore and 
sea concessions off DA No. 1
2, Base Minerals
Tsumeb Corporation Ltd., TCL 
Tsumeb, Kombat, Matchless, 
Asis Ost.
South West Africa Company 
Limited SWACO
Berg Aukas, Brandberg West, 
Asis Ost
Kiln Products Limited 
Berg Aukas
Oamites Mining Company 
(Pty) Limited 
Oamites
Otjihase Mining Company 
(Pty) Limited 
Otjihase
Klein Aub Koper Maatskappy
Beperk
Klein Aub
Imcor Zinc (Pty) Limited 
Rosh Pinah
Uis Tin Mining Company Ltd. 
Uis
Onganja mine 
Seei s
Type of Mineral
Gemstones
Gemstones
Cadmium, blister copper 
refined lead, smelter 
silver, zinc concentrates; 
by-products, arsenic 
trioxide, germanium
Lead vanadate cones., 
lead and zinc sulphides, 
zinc sillicates, tin/ 
tungsten cones.
Waelz kiln production 
zinc oxide cones.
Copper cones.,
Silver ores.
Copper cones., pyrite 
cones., precious metals.
Parent Companies 
De Beers Consolidated 
Mines Limited (100%)
De Beers
Copper Cones.
AMAX Inc (29.6%), Newmont 
Mining Corporation (29.6%) 
Selection Trust (14.2%)
O'okiep Copper Company (9.5%)
Union Corporation (9.4%)
SWACO (2.4%).
Anglo-American (44%) Consol­
idated Goldfields CGF (43%)
Charter Consoldiated (2%) 11% 
other until 1976. Then Kiln 
Products Ltd. (100%).
Goldfields of South Africa 
GFSA (55%) unlisted subsidiary.
Falconbridge Nickel Mines (74.9%), 
Industrial Development Corpor­
ation of SA, IDC (25.1%).
Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investments (67%), Minerts.
General Mining/Foderale Mynbou 
( 100% ) .
Lead and zinc Cones. ISCOR (100%).
Tin Cones. 
Copper cones.
ISCOR (100%).
Zapata Corporation via 93%- 
ownod Granby Minina Corporation
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TABLE 29 (continued
Mining Company and Mine Typo of Mineral Parent Companies
Nordex Joint Venture Ltd., 
Krantzberg
S.W.A. Lithium Mines (Pty) 
Ltd., Karibib
Dr Bergers Mines (Pty) Ltd., 
Karibib
Bantu Mining Corporation 
Oshakati
Tantalite Valley Minerals
(Pty) Limited
Karasburg
3. Uranium
Rossing Uranium Limited 
Rossing/Arandis
Langer Heinrich Uranium 
(Pty) Limited (Under 
Development)
Tungsten cones.
Lithium ores, ambli- 
gonite, lepidolite, 
petalite.
Marble, 
wollostonite.
Sodalite
Tantalite
Uranium Oxide
Uranium Oxide
Nord Resources Corporation 
(40%) Ebco Mining Company 
(Bethlehem Steel) (60%)
Metallgesellschaft AG (100%).
Dr Bergers Mines
SA Government
Tantalite V alley
Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. (45.5%) 
IDC (13.2%) Rio Algom (RTZ) 
(10%) Minatomes SA (10%) 
General Mining (6 .8 %)
Other (14.5%)
General Mining/Federale 
Mynbou (100%)
Notes:
1 Anglo American, De Beers, Johannesburg Consolidated and Charter Consolidated are jointly 
controlled. South African.
2 General Mining, Federale Minbou, Minerts and Union are South African controlled.
3 ISCOR and IDC are South African state corporations.
4 Newmont and AMAX are US controlled. O'okiep is controlled by them jointly; Selection
Trust by AMAX.
5 Bethlehem Steel is US controlled.
6  Falconbridge is Canadian and Zapata joint Canadian-US controlled.
7 RTZ and Consolidated Gold Fields are British controlled. Kiln is controlled by 
Consolidated.
8  Metalgosellschaft is German controlled.
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MINERAL, METAL PRODUCTION 1972-76 
(metric tons unless otherwise specified)
TABLE 30
Commodity
Diamonds1
Silver^
Copper
blister
concentrates
Lead
refined 
concentrates 
lead/vandate cones 
Cadmium 
Zinc
Silicate concentrates’ 
Sulphide concentrates 
Zinc Oxides 
Lithium ores 
amblygonite 
lepidolite 
potalite 
Tin
metal
concentrate
Wolfram
Uranium
1972
1.500.000
1.373.000
26, 200 
22,000
68,200 
700 
4,500 
100
29, OOO 
43,400 
23,900
n. a. 
n. a. 
n . a.
660
1973
1,600,000
1,563,000
22,000
66,000
59.000
20.000 
9,000
100
28.000
43.000
28.000
51
3.500
3.500
1,060
120
1974
1.500.000
1.556.000
46,775
60,000
64,600
26.000
0, OOO 
lOO
24.000
40.000
32.000
60
4,500
1, 500
1,100
230
1975
1,747,739
1,600,000
36,500
6 6 .000
44,400
22.000 
5,000
lOO
20,000
40,000
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
1,117
n.a.
1976
1,693,994
n.a.
43,000
40,000
30,000
800
1, 500
Notes;
1 Carats
2 Ounces
Source: World Mining, Catalog, Survey and Directory Number, June 1973, June, 1977, New York
(The figures are prepared by World Mini no editors from 'a variety of individual sources'.
As such their accuracy cannot be guaranteed and there are some discrepancies with those of 
other non-official sources in the field, particularly with respect to copper and lead 
production; however these have been found to bo the most generally reliable).
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RECURRENT BUDGET SUMMARY 1976-77
TABLE 31
Revenue Item %
Income Tax 26. 5 14
Company Tax 83.7 45
Value Added Tax 7.4 4
Duty 36.0 19
Repayment of loans, interest 7.0 4
Other income 26.2 14
Total Revenue 186.8 100
Expenditure
White: 74.0 53
General administration 12.2
Education 15.0
Health 14.2
Other social expenditure 8.3
Economic services 24.3
African: 53.6 38
Bantu administration 49.5
Bantu education 3.5
Coloured: 13.0 9
Administrztion 12.0
Education 1.0
Total Expenditure 140.01 100
Security Police 4.51
Military expenditure 250.02
Notes:
1 Excludes Security Policy which is in SWA Budgets.
2 In RSA not SWA Budget; rough estimates of portion
relating to Namibia.
Source: Data derived from Tables 32, 33, Economic
Development in Namibia.
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TABLE 32
GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND EXPENDITURE 
(R 000,000)
1978/79 
(Estimated 
Actuals)
"1985/86 
(Projected 
Estimates)
Revenue
Diamonds
Company Tax 
Profits Tax 
Export Duty 
Other Company Tax 
Uranium 
Other Mining 
Other 
Income Tax 
Loan Levy
Customs and Excise 
Sales Tax
Licenses 2
Departmental Revenue 
Proceeds on Investments 
Loan Recoveries 
Miscellaneous
125
30
35
164
190
16i
37i
25
45|
8
2
13
3
7-1 ' 28
356
135
30
35
125
25
50
200
200
65
50
50
2-1215
50
5
12j
650
Expenditure'
Recurrent
Capital
215)
140
355
350-400
350-400
700-750
Domestic Borrowing - 25
External Grants/Borrowing - 50
Notes:
1 1978/79 Consolidation of South West Africa Account, Consolidated 
Revenue Fund (RSA) and Territorial Estimates of Revenue and 
Expenditure (SWA). Diamond revenue adjusted for probable 
outcome above estimates.
2 "1985-86" assumes higher excess profits and company taxes, 
somewhat more progressive personal income tax, about the same 
rates of indirect tax.
3 1978/79 excludes an item appearing as expenditure in RSA and 
revenue in SWA Accounts in respect of "Coloured - Rehoboth -
• Nama" expenditure.
oo
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4 "1985/86” assumes profit from Central Bank and a few other
state bodies paid into general revenue but R 175 million 
retained for parastatal investment.
* 5 The sectoral breakdown of existing accounts is not very
revealing. Further, it is based on colour divided services 
in a manner making reconstruction of the Figures along lines
• comparable to a "1985/86" budget almost impossible.
6 "Security" expenditure not included.
7 Assumes basic service provision approaching universal coverage. 
Includes some security expenditure.
8 Assumed public sector investment budget:
Government (R 000,000)
Recurrent Revenue 
Domestic Borrowing 
Foreign Grants/Borrowing
Total Revenue
Government Projects 
Investment in Parastatals
Total Expenditure
Public Enterprises (Parastatals)
175 
30 
100 
50
355
350
5
355
Retained Surplus 
Local Borrowing (Net) 
Foreign Borrowing (Net) 
State Investment
Total Resources
Investment
State Loan Repayment 
Total Uses
300
25
50
375
325
50
375
Consolidated Public Sector 
Investment
675
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General Note to Tables
Tables 1 through 10, 12-13, 15-16, 18, 20 derived from 
Toward Manpower Development For Namibia, United Nations 
Institute for Namibia, Lusaka and Tables 21,23, 24, 26 
largely constructed from FAO sources.
Tables 11, 24-25, 27-28 derived from W„S. Barthold Namibia1s 
Economic Potential and Existing Economic Ties with the 
Republic of South Africa. German Development Institute, Berlin.
Tables 29 and 30 derived from The Mineral Industry of Namibia: 
Perspectives for Independence, Commonwealth Secretariat, London.
Tables 31 and 32 derived from RSA and SWA Estimates and W.H. 
Thomas, Economic Development In Namibia.
In the absence of either complete or reliable offical statistics 
most tables constructed in large measure from a wide array of 
newspapers, journal, company and observer reports and estimations.
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